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INTRODUCTION
Child abuse is a societal problem of tragic proportions in
America. On a yearly basis, over two million reports of child
abuse and neglect are made to state child protective service agen-
cies,' over one million children suffer demonstrable harm as a
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1. In 1989, there were 2.4 million reports of child abuse. NATIONAL CENTER ON
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION RESEARCH, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING
AND FATALITIES: THE RESULTS OF THE 1989 ANNUAL FFTY STATE SURVEY 2 (1990)
[hereinafter CUR ENT TRENDS].
While precise comparison of figures from year to year, even with respect to abuse
reports, is difficult because of changes in definition and variation in reporting procedures
among the states, the number of reported child abuse cases rose dramatically during the
1980s. The increase can be demonstrated through a variety of sources, such as studies
prepared by the American Humane Society. One such study shows an increase in child
abuse reports from 669,000 in 1976 to 2,178,000 in 1987. AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N,
1987 HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 5 (1989).
Because of their sophistication and consistency, two federal studies conducted dur-
ing the 1980s provide excellent sets of data for comparison. For a one-year period cover-
ing the last half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, a total of 1.1 million children were
reported to Child Protective Services as suspected victims of child abuse or neglect. NA-
TIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
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result of abuse and neglect,' and over eleven hundred children die
SERVICES, STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 39 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 STUDY FINDINGS]. In 1986,
Child Protective Services received reports concerning more than 1.65 million children, a
57% increase. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND
PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1988, at 6-1 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
STUDY FINDINGS].
How to interpret the increase in the number of reported cases is a matter of some
dispute. It may be that abuse has increased dramatically, or that either recognition or
reporting rates have risen. There is reason to believe that, at least in the first part of the
decade, the major reason for the increasing number of reports was a greater likelihood
of recognition of child abuse by professionals rather than a dramatic increase in the inci-
dence of abuse. 1988 STUDY FINDINGS, supra, at 3-12 to 3-13, 6-4, 7-9 to 7-10 (infer-
ring from the relative stability of severe abuse and dramatic increases only in marginal
types of impairment that it was a greater ability to recognize abuse, as opposed to an
increase in actual rates of abuse, that produced higher levels of reported cases, because
truly higher rates of abuse should logically have produced increases across all categories).
Others suggest that increase in maltreatment may also be occurring as a result of increas-
es in social problems that contribute to abuse, such as homelessness, poverty, and partic-
ularly substance abuse. See, e.g., CURRENT TRENDS, supra, at 3-5; see also J. Michael
Murphy et al., Substance Abuse and Serious Child Mistreatment: Prevalence, Risk, and
Outcome in a Court Sample, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197, 207-10 (1991) (indicating
correlation between substance abuse and some of the worst aspects of abuse); Nancy
Lewis, When Home Isn't a Haven; D.C. Seeks the Safest Place for Children Facing Abuse,
WASH. POST, June 8, 1992, at Al (documenting increase in child abuse and neglect cases
in 1992 and growing link to drug use within the family).
Another explanation for the increasing number of reported cases is over-reporting
of abuse. Many of the reports that are filed go unsubstantiated. For 1979-1980, only
42.7% of the reports were substantiated. 1981 STUDY FINDINGS, supra, at 12. Depending
upon the data analysis used, the percentage substantiated for 1986 either remained about
the same, AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N, 1986 HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT
AND ABUSE REPORTING 11 (1988), or increased to 53%, 1988 STUDY FINDINGS, supra,
at 6-6. The fact that a report is "unsubstantiated" should not be taken to mean that it
was without foundation, as numerous explanations, from excessive agency workloads that
prevent full investigation to an inadvertent error in the address given by an anonymous
reporter, can account for the failure to substantiate. CURRENT TRENDS, supra, at 7. Nev-
ertheless, it is true that in the 1981 federal study, a majority of the unsubstantiated cases
were determined "invalid" by the caseworker upon a determination that the children had
not been abused or neglected. 1981 STUDY FINDINGS, supra, at 13.
However, even if the number of reported cases is overstated, the figures on reports
to state child protective service agencies clearly underrepresent the known abuse. For
example, in 1986, less than half of the cases of abuse and neglect known to professionals
made their way to reports of abuse or neglect received by CPS agencies. 1988 STUDY
FINDINGS, supra, at 6-8 to 6-11.
2. The figure provided is based on 1986 data as described by a comprehensive
federal study that collected and analyzed data on the incidence of child abuse nationally.
1988 STUDY FINDINGS, supra note 1, at 7-1. This somewhat dated figure is used because
no more recent study exhibits the completeness and sophistication of that report.
Other figures from this study give some concreteness to the seriousness of the
abuse suffered. In 1986, over 150,000 children were victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 3-6. In
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as a consequence of such abuse and neglect?
Beyond these numbers, the horror of the crime itself, as peri-
odically brought to our attention through news reports of acts of
almost unimaginable brutality, and the general helplessness of its
victims wrench us emotionally. Its intractability as a social ill and
its difficult detection challenge the ability of our institutions to
operate effectively. We are taunted by the growing numbers of
victims and our inability effectively to prevent the abuse, to punish
the perpetrators, and to treat its victims.
5
The combination of our intense concern about the problem of
child abuse and the difficulty in finding a solution makes the area
of child abuse one in which legal doctrines are put to their stern-
est test and new ground is frequently broken. This area is where
evidentiary concepts in particular are always challenged, often re-
addition to the fatalities, which numbered 1,100 in that year, 160,000 children suffered
serious injuries as a result of abuse or neglect. Id. at 3-11.
3. CURRENT TRENDS, supra note 1, at 15.
Even this figure on fatalities, which should logically be the most accurate because
life-taking abuse should be the most obvious, is subject to some debate. Some experts
estimate that the actual number of fatalities, rather than slightly over twelve hundred,
ranges from two thousand to five thousand. Murphy et al., supra note 1,. at 197.
4. The murder of six-year-old Lisa Steinberg in November 1987 by Joel Steinberg,
who had been helping to raise her, became a symbol of child abuse in America and the
capacity of adults to inflict senseless harm on children in their care. Ronald Sullivan,
Steinberg Given Maximum Term of 8 Years to 25 Years in Child's Death, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1989, at Al; Ronald Sullivan, Steinberg Is Guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989, at Al. Jacqueline Bouknight's apparent murder of her one-
year-old son, whom she had earlier abused and who disappeared while in her care, pro-
vided another example of this same horror played out in the national spotlight of Su-
preme Court litigation. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup. Fifth Amendment Is
Pitted Against Child's Welfare in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at A18; see
Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1990) (recount-
ing evidence of early abuse, based on direct observations by medical personnel of mis-
treatment during hospitalization for a fractured femur and on examinations indicating
several other partially healed bone fractures and other signs of severe abuse).
5. Douglas Besharov, an authority on child abuse and a participant in many of the
developments in the area of improved reporting and treatment of abuse, has noted that
our reaction to the horror stories has driven us almost blindly to take action but that
such action has often been misguided, producing often vague and overbroad laws and
excessive intervention into family control of children. Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Some-
thing" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 567-79 (1985). He also concludes that one of the conse-
quences of the public reaction to the problem is over-reporting of abuse and neglect that
is in part responsible for the large number of unsubstantiated reports, which are some-
times generated by professionals "playing it safe" to avoid being sued or prosecuted. Id.
at 556-57.
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made, and sometimes mangled.6 In child abuse cases, new types of
expert testimony are received readily,7" new uses for old hearsay
exceptions are found,' new methods of receiving testimony are
developed,9 and new approaches to constitutional principles are announced. °
6. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 842 (Kan. 1985) (noting that without
specific exception for child-victim hearsay, some courts had unreasonably stretched the
limits of the excited utterance exception, particularly its requirement that the event and
statement must be relatively contemporaneous, thereby threatening to undercut the cer-
tainty and integrity of the general hearsay exception).
A number of courts have expressed concern that doctrines designed for use in child
abuse prosecutions, if approved, are subject to expansion either into other areas of par-
ticular legislative concern or across the board. See People v. Bastien, 541 N.E.2d 670, 677
(11. 1989) (state conceded at oral argument that if provision permitting ex parte video-
tape statement of child sexual abuse victim were found constitutional, there was no rea-
son why it could not be used for other witnesses); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524
N.E.2d 366, 374 & nn.13-14 (Mass. 1988) (rule permitting child witness to testify through
electronic means outside presence of defendant held unconstitutional under state constitu-
tion in part because court concluded that no principled distinction could be drawn be-
tween child witnesses and any other class which the legislature might in the future deem
in need of special treatment); see also People v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 750 (Colo.
1989) (expressing concern that holding that the potential trauma of testifying by child
sexual abuse victim satisfies unavailability requirement might be viewed as opening a
broad exception to the normal rule that witnesses ought to testify at trial and that defen-
dants ought not to be convicted by hearsay testimony); Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338,
1347 (Miss. 1989) (noting that the social phenomenon of child sexual abuse has seared
society's collective consciousness with the result that it demands vigorous prosecution and
relaxed rules of admissibility, although court feared consequences and chose to move
cautiously because few charges are more difficult to defend).
7. Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony Concerning Social Framework Evidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 85, 112-28 (noting that courts will admit expert testimony that children suffered
from sexual abuse and even testimony buttressing credibility of children, although they
are much more restrictive in receiving similar testimony regarding adult victims of rape).
8. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medi-
cal Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257, 275-77 (1989) (noting that statements
by child identifying specific individual as perpetrator of sexual assault have been admitted
under hearsay exception for statement for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment
based on an extension of the theory considering such identification relevant to treatment).
9. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3168 (1990) (testimony of child may be given
in room separated from the jury and the defendant upon showing that child would suffer
trauma from testifying otherwise); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1024-25 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting uniform statutory determination that all child-victims
of certain age testify separated from defendant by screen, but suggesting that more par-
ticularized determination of harm to child from testifying would pass constitutional mus-
ter).
10. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (holding that, in case involving child sex-
ual abuse, prosecution not required to demonstrate unavailability of declarant under Con-
frontation Clause where out-of-court statement satisfied well-established hearsay exceptions
for spontaneous declarations and statements for medical diagnosis).
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Similarly, through mandatory child abuse reporting laws, we
are experimenting with the use of attorneys as crime detectors and
informants and concomitantly encroaching on the legal protections
for attorney-client confidences. The challenges these reporting laws
pose to attorney-client confidences are illustrated by an imagined
lawyer-client conference:
A domestic relations lawyer meets with a married couple
who want to structure their future financial affairs such that
monetary issues will be easily settled if the marriage does not
last. They confide that although on the whole their relationship is
a positive one, they have had problems. In specific, the husband
became so angry during one of their disputes some months ago
that he struck and injured one of their children who required
medical treatment for a broken bone but no hospitalization. The
hospital did not view the injury as suspicious. The couple report
that they are making progress in repairing their relationship, and
believe it will last, but they are not sure.
Depending on the state in which this conversation occurs and the
interpretation of concepts analyzed later in this Article, the consul-
tation and much more may effectively terminate at this point."
Instead of continuing with the discussion of the couple's
situation, the lawyer interrupts, informing the couple that in
order to avoid her own criminal prosecution, she must report the
husband's act of child abuse to state authorities within twenty-
four hours. The lawyer advises that she is confident that a formal
investigation by child protective services will follow, and warns
that criminal charges may ultimately be filed against the husband.
She suggests that the husband may want to retain a criminal de-
fense attorney, but warns him that since he has not yet been
formally accused of a crime, any incriminating statements he
makes to the defense attorney may also be subject to disclo-
sure.
12
11. In the phrase "much more," I mean to include not only the lawyer-client rela-
tionship and the marriage, but also an opportunity to discourage additional physical child
abuse.
12. Some readers may have the reaction that this advice cannot possibly be correct:
surely the Fifth Amendment would provide constitutional protection for the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in this context. However, the advice may indeed be sound, and whether the
statements would be subject to disclosure depends on the nature of state law regarding
the attorney-client privilege, not constitutional principles. See infra Section IV(C).
1992]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
In this scenario, a transformation of the lawyer-from a confi-
dential consultant providing legitimate legal advice to a required
reporter of a client's criminal misdeeds-is clearly presented.
Whether the operation of child abuse reporting laws will actually
significantly alter the traditional protections afforded to confiden-
tial attorney-client communications remains to be determined.
Certainly the changes in the law that make such a result a possi-
bility began largely through inadvertence and have not yet been
vigorously pressed. However, as the hypothetical illustrates, the
field of child abuse again provides an opportunity for experimenta-
tion, which may affect both the law of evidentiary privilege and of
professional ethics. In an era in which the role and value of law-
yers is subject to popular attack and the desire to get tough on
crime and criminals is the major refrain of politicians and the
public alike, the experiment, depending upon one's perspective,
either poses clear dangers for traditional protection for client con-
fidences or promises great reform.'
Reporting of child abuse by lawyers involves the interaction of
three types of legal rules. First, statutes have been enacted in
twenty-two states that require attorney reporting of child abuse.14
Typically, these statutes establish mandatory duties to report
known or suspected child abuse and are applicable to the entire
public, including lawyers--only a few statutes specifically identify
attorneys as a professional group required to report abuse. The
reporting duties are enforced by criminal penalties and supple-
mented by immunity from civil suit for the act of reporting sus-
pected abuie."5
Second, the attorney-client privilege, which excludes from
evidence statements made by an individual in confidence to an
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, 6 potentially
13. In reality, however, the effects of the experiment are not so clear-cut. The dou-
ble-edge quality of many of the issues raised by these cases makes them particularly
difficult from both an emotional and a legal perspective. For example, on the one hand,
reporting of the couple's revelation may damage potentially valuable relationships. On the
other, the lawyer may have learned only of the tip of the iceberg, and her disclosure
may prevent terrible future damage to the couple's children.
14. These statutes are discussed infra in subsection I(B)(1).
15. Lucy A. YouNEs, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STATE CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT LAWS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 1985, at 17-20 (1987).
16. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(rev. ed. 1961).
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conflicts with the reporting requirements as applied to lawyers.
The interaction between the attorney-client privilege and reporting
laws is, however, uncertain. The reporting laws may have the in-
tent or the effect of abrogating the attorney-client privilege and
therefore mandate that attorneys report information about their
clients' abusive conduct even when gained through conversations
that would normally be protected by the privilege. Although I
argue against such an interpretation, abrogation of the privilege
would appear to be the reasonable interpretation of the statutory
language in some states. A fundamental change of this type in the
scope of the attorney-client privilege raises questions about the
extent to which the privilege has a constitutional basis and wheth-
er it can be radically modified by simple legislative action.
Third, rules of professional responsibility also may conflict
with mandatory reporting requirements. These ethics rules mandate
that an attorney, on pain of professional discipline, protect the
confidences and secrets of her client." Nevertheless, lawyers may
be required or permitted to report child abuse under two major
exceptions to these ethics rules. Lawyers are permitted to reveal
confidential information when "required by law" to do so, and the
child abuse reporting statutes may constitute such a superseding
legal duty automatically permitting disclosure. In addition, because
it constitutes a crime often likely to be repeated, information
about past child abuse may be subject to disclosure under another
exception to confidentiality rules that permits or requires attorneys
to reveal their clients' intention to commit a future crime.
A classic statement of the basic elements of the privilege is contained in United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) with-
out the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceed-
ing, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59; see also REV. UNIF. R. EviD. 502 (1986).
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1982) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(a) & cmt. at 22
(1989) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. States have enacted various versions of these models




Determining whether disclosure is required or permitted en-
tails examination of the dimensions of the reporting laws, the
attorney-client privilege, and attorney disciplinary rules. This Arti-
cle moves progressively from the analysis of specific, somewhat
mundane issues, such as statutory construction, to the basic justifi-
cation for protecting confidences in- this area and the options for
legislative reform of the attorney-client privilege. It begins by
applying currently accepted doctrine to issues of child abuse re-
porting, but concludes with an examination of the justifications for
the doctrines themselves. Thus, readers who proceed from a funda-
mental skepticism of the value of protecting attorney-client confi-
dences may be frustrated by an initial apparent acceptance of what
some view as little more than professional protectionism and may
wish to skip to Parts IV and V for a more critical analysis.
In Part I, I develop the history of reporting statutes in the
United States and then detail the specific statutes that require at-
torney reporting of abuse, paying particular attention to the treat-
ment of the attorney-client privilege in the states in which these
statutes have been enacted. I reach the overall conclusion that the
statutes do not exhibit an intent to abrogate the attorney-client
privilege. However, they rarely spell out how that privilege should
apply, if at all, to out-of-court reporting requirements, an issue left
in doubt by the traditional definition of the attorney-client privi-
lege.
In Part II, I examine the scope of the attorney-client privilege
as it relates to such out-of-court disclosures. My conclusion is that
the attorney-client privilege, interpreted in light of its history and
policies, should be construed to prevent disclosures under current
reporting laws when the reports are based on confidential commu-
nications made for the purpose of receiving legal advice.
In Part III, I analyze numerous challenges to the ethical prin-
ciple of confidentiality that arise when an attorney receives infor-
mation regarding child abuse. I conclude that in most instances
disclosure is not authorized under the "required by law" exception
to these rules of professional ethics, but that disclosure will more
frequently be authorized under the exception for a client's inten-
tion to commit a future crime. Unfortunately, the determination of
when disclosure is permitted under the "future crimes" exception
remains a fact-bound and delicate inquiry, and I argue that broad
use of this exception is fraught with dangers of (or opportunities
for) expansion into other types of predictably repetitive crime.
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The fact that legislatures did not intend to abrogate the attor-
ney-client privilege through existing child abuse reporting statutes
does not mean that legislation may not explicitly pursue such a
purpose in the future. In Part IV, I examine the question of the
proper scope of the attorney-client privilege given the legislative
purposes revealed by most of the reporting statutes. I conclude
that the policy determinations evident in the abrogation of eviden-
Stiary privileges for professionals other than attorneys are fatal to
the argument that the privilege should be maintained so that law-
yers can learn of and discourage future illegal conduct. Further-
more, the Constitution provides only very limited protection for
the attorney-client privilege and leaves the definition of the privi-
lege to be largely a matter of legislative choice and policy judg-
ment.
In Part V, I set out suggestions for clarification of problematic
aspects of current statutes, providing three alternatives for statuto-
ry revision of the attorney-client privilege as it relates to child
abuse reporting requirements. These three versions of the privilege
vary according to policy judgments about the value of, and appro-
priate purposes for, the attorney-client privilege. Finally, I examine
some of the implications of current developments in the role of
the attorney as a reporter of crime that are emerging from this
emotionally charged area of child abuse. Indeed, how we resolve
the issues regarding the attorney-client confidentiality may have as
much to do with our determination of how we feel about the
growing regulation of our lives through use of criminal sanctions
as it does with doctrinal analysis of rules governing lawyer-client
confidentiality. I argue that the game is not worth the candle: The
minimal benefits to the cause of protecting children is outweighed
by the damage to doctrines historically important in protecting
individual autonomy, particularly by the dangers inherent in ap-
proving threatened criminal sanctions as a means of transforming
lawyers into mandatory reporters of crime.
I. THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A. Historical Overview
Following a period of innovative medical research and effec-
tive publicity on the problem of child abuse, 8 states began in the
18. Allan H. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults upon the Family: Part
19921
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early 1960s to enact statutes requiring the reporting of child abuse.
Although some statutes were independently developed,19 most
were inspired by national efforts and influenced by model legisla-
tion. In 1963, the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare drafted the first model reporting statute?
Proposals by the American Medical Association and the Council
of State Governments soon followedY.2  By 1967, every state had
adopted some form of reporting legislation.'
Although varying somewhat in detail, the initial versions of
these statutes subjected only physicians to mandatory reporting re-
quirements.5 The early reporting statutes also expressly abrogated
the physician-patient privilege along with, in most instances, the
husband-wife privilege.'
Reporting laws quickly expanded beyond physicians and medi-
cal personnel to include others under their mandatory reporting
requirements. They followed two basic patterns, although often the
two were combined.' Some statutes listed as mandatory reporters
One, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-19 (1965) (discussing the development of the medical litera-
ture on the subject of child abuse and the efforts of the medical profession to focus
public concern on the problem).
19. Id. at 21-26.
20. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE
ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON RE
PORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963).
The same year, the American Humane Association published guidelines for legisla-
tion. CHILDREN'S DIVISION, AMERICAN HUMANE ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION
TO PROTECT THE BATTERED CHILD (1963).
21. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, PHYSICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN--SUGGESTED LEG-
ISLATION (1965); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION
(1965).
22. See Douglas . Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected
Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL L. REV. 458, 466 (1978); Brian G. Fraser, A Glance
at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the
Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 649-50
(1978); Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20
FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1986); Mary H. Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?: Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV.
723, 726-27 (1987).
23. Besharov, supra note 22, at 466-67.
24. Mitchell, supra note 22, at 726-27; CHILDREN'S DIVISION, AMERICAN HUMANE
ASS'N, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION: ANALYSIS OF REPORTING LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 31 (1966) (reporting that in 1966, a number of states followed a model that both
focused exclusively on doctors and appeared to abrogate only the doctor-patient privi-
lege).
25. Almost any effort to trace a national trend in legislation overly simplifies the
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a wide range of specifically identified professionals, such as teach-
ers, social workers, and law enforcement personnel, who along
with physicians were likely to have early contact with abused chil-
dren.' Other statutes used a catchall provision that required re-
porting by "any person" or "any other person" added to a more
limited list of designated reportersY Under both types of statutes,
if a person required by the statute to report abuse failed to do so
promptly, that failure constituted a criminal violation, typically a
misdemeanor.
Another round of statutory developments and refinement of
reporting requirements was prompted in the mid-1970s by the
enactment of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974." That act encouraged states to improve their child
process. In actuality, the pattern in any state is likely fo be complicated, with changes in
the law produced by multiple influences. For instance, by 1986 California had amended
its reporting statute fifteen times. Meriwether, supra note 22, at 142-43. In some states,
the course of reform is even documented by law review analysis. See, e.g., Michael R.
Chamberlain & Gerald M. Eaton, Protecting the Abused and Neglected Child, 19 N.H.
BJ. 25 (1977); Walter E. Forehand, Are New Procedures Correction Enough for Florida's
Child Abuse Registry Statute?, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 371 (1991); Kathryn M. Krause,
Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Legislation in Missouri, 42 Mo. L. REV. 207 (1977).
26. The trend to include additional professional groups has continued with new ones
added to statutes each year. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE: A
GUIDE FOR THE CONCERNED 23 (1990).
27. Besharov, supra note 22, at 467-69; Fraser, supra note 22, at 656-58.
The first major group to advocate requiring universal reporting was the American
Humane Association. In 1966, it recommended that, to assure protection to the maximum
number of children and for reasons of simplicity, states should revise their statutes to
mandate "that any person having knowledge of child abuse is required to' report."
CHILDREN'S DIVISION, supra note 24, at 17. But see Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal
Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 713 (1966) (arguing that re-
porting requirement should be placed solely on doctors, who have the skill to detect
difficult cases, and contending that if the reporting group is large the sense of duty may
become weak). See generally Alan Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse. A Review of the
Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 271-76 (1974) (discussing the debate about the appropriate
breadth of reporting laws).
In 1966, only three of forty-seven states with reporting statutes had mandatory
provisions applicable to all citizens. CHILDREN'S DIVISION, supra note 24, at 16. A de-
cade later, the picture had changed dramatically, with roughly twenty states having such
laws. Besharov, supra note 22, at 469.
28. YOUNES, supra note 15, at 17. In 1985, all but four states punished failure to re-
port by mandatory reporters as a misdemeanor. Id.; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1619(b)
(Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-6.1 (1990).
29. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1988 &
Supp. II 1990)).
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abuse reporting and treatment systems by offering grants to state
programs meeting the new federal standards.'
A new model reporting statute, which provided a blueprint for
satisfying federal requirements, was quickly released.31 The model
statute followed the pattern of specifically identifying professionals
required to report abuse, a list that did not include lawyers. The
statute also proposed abrogation of the husband-wife privilege and
all privileges between any professional person and her patient or
client, except, notably, the "attorney-client privilege?2 Within the
span of a few years, all but a handful of states had revamped their
laws to meet the new federal requirements.3
The history of the enactment of reporting laws thus demon-
strates that lawyers, although perhaps not totally ignored,' were
not a prime target of the mandatory reporting requirements. Even
more clearly, the attorney-client privilege was neither marked for
30. JOSEPH J. COSTA & GORDON K. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: LEGIS-
LATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION 17, 19-20 (1978); Besharov, supra note 5, at
542-43; Mitchell, supra note 22, at 727 n.19.
31. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT PROJECT, EDUCATION COMM'N OF THE STATES, RE-
PORT No. 71, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: MODEL LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES
(1975). This model act was drafted by Brian Fraser and Douglas Besharov, two leading
advocates and scholars in the field. Id. at 1.
32. The language of the model statute on this point is as follows:
Such privileged communications, excluding those of attorney and client, shall not
constitute grounds for failure to report as required or permitted by this Act, to
cooperate with the child protective service in its activities pursuant to this Act,
or to give or accept evidence in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse,
sexual abuse or neglect.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added). This provision clearly preserves the attorney-client privilege,
although the commentary gives no indication why the attorney-client privilege is pre-
served. Id.
Another model act drafted two years later, which contains an almost identical pro-
vision regarding abrogation of privileges, provides some insight. NATIONAL CENTER ON
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, MODEL CHILD
PROTECTION AcT WITH COMMENTARY 31 (draft Aug. 1977) [hereinafter MODEL CHILD
PROTECTION ACT]. Its commentary gives two reasons for preserving the attorney-client
privilege: first, abrogation of the attorney-client privilege would be unnecessary because
by the time the case reaches court the child should have been protected and sufficient
evidence obtained; and second, abrogation would probably be unconstitutional as violative
of the right to confidences necessary to a fair trial. Id. at 32.
33. Besharov, supra note 5, at 543-44.
34. The American Medical Association called for reporting by lawyers, albeit on a
voluntary basis, in the mid-1960s. See Editorial, Battered Child Legislation, J.A.M.A., Apr.
27, 1964, at 136; Annual Report, J.A.M.A., Oct. 25, 1965, at 139, 172.
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abrogation by any of the model legislation" nor viewed as an
important impediment to effective detection of abuse.
The detailed examination of current statutes that follows dem-
onstrates little, if any, intent to abrogate the attorney-client privi-
lege. Indeed, in the vast majority of the statutes, lawyers are cov-
ered only under the general duty applying to all citizens. More-
over, although the continued viability of the attorney-client privi-
lege is not always stated and any protection afforded by the privi-
lege against required reporting is rarely specified, the attorney-
client privilege is virtually nowhere affirmatively abrogated by
these statutes.
Thus, the impact of reporting laws on the protections afforded
to attorney-client confidences was apparently either entirely unin-
tended by the drafters of the legislation or at most a byproduct of
a more general attempt to expand broadly the scope of reporting
requirements to have the maximum impact upon the problem of
child abuse. Nevertheless, the reporting duties on attorneys are
real and the effect on attorney-client confidences potentially very
significant.
35. The major model acts either expressly preserved the attorney-client privilege or
omitted it from the list of privileges to be abrogated. The 1963 model act proferred by
the Children's Bureau stated with regard to privileges: "Neither the physician-patient
privilege nor the husband-wife privilege shall be a ground for excluding evidence regard-
ing a child's injuries or the caur-, thereof, in any judicial proceeding resulting from a
report pursuant to this Act." CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 20, at 12-13. The Ameri-
can Humane Association guidelines were even narrower, focusing only on eliminating the
physician-patient privilege. CHILDREN'S DIVISION, supra note 20, at 6-7. The provisions of
two second-generation models, which specifically preserve the attorney-client privilege, are
discussed in note 32 supra.
Only the Council of State Governments model act of 1965, which required re-
porting exclusively by medical personnel, contained language that could possibly be con-
strued to call for abrogation of the attorney-client privilege. Its provision regarding privi-
leges reads as follows:
In any proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to this act or in any
proceeding where such a report or any contents thereof are sought to be intro-
duced in evidence, such report or contents or any other fact or facts related
thereto or to the condition of the child who is the subject of the report shall
not be excluded on the ground that the matter is or may be the subject of a
physician-patient privilege or similar privilege or rule against disclosure.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 21, at 68 (emphasis added).
The American Medical Association model differed from the others in calling only
for voluntary reporting by all reporters. Annual Report, supra note 34, at 172.
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B. The Individual Statutes
1. Reporting Requirements. In Addition to mandating report-
ing of abuse by certain individuals, child abuse reporting statutes
typically permit anyone to repori child abuse.' As to both man-
datory and voluntary reporters, the statutes provide immunity from
suit for the act of reporting suspected abuse.' Although an im-
portant source of information about abuse, voluntary reporting by
lawyers has no impact on the attorney-client privilege or ethics
rules requiring the protection of confidential conversations." As a
result, I concentrate exclusively on statutes that include lawyers
among mandatory reporters. 9
36. YOUNEs, supra note 15, at 17. Thirty-six states had such permissive provisions in
1985. Id; see, e.g., ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(B) (1989); COLO. REv'. STAT. §
19-10--104(3) (1986).
37. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 906 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
620.030(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1991). However, in some states the immunity provided to
mandatory reporters may be broader than that accorded to voluntary reporters, as is the
case in California. See Krikorian v. Barry, 242 Cal. Rptr. 312 (Ct. App. 1987) (immunity
absolute for mandatory reporters but not for voluntary reporters). Vermont and Massa-
chusetts also treat permissive reporters differently. YOUNES, supra note 15, at 18-19.
38. Other principles, such as the authorization afforded to a lawyer to reveal infor-
mation that a client intends to commit a future crime, may override the confidentiality
requirement in the ethics rules. However, permissive reporting provisions neither expand
nor contract any protections otherwise afforded to confidential communications.
One possible exception to the principle that permissive provisions have no impact
on reporting duties of lawyers may be found in the Wisconsin statute. That statute spe-
cifically states that "[a]ny other person, including an attorney, having reason to suspect
that a child has been abused or neglected ... may make ... such a report." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2)(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The statute,
which itself contains no provisions abrogating any privileges, does not explain what im-
pact this permissive provision is intended to have on the attorney-client privilege. WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). The attorney-client privilege statute it-
self provides no exception for child abuse, id., in contrast to the physician-patient privi-
lege, which excludes examinations of abused or injured children from the privilege, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 905.04(4)(e) (West 1975 & Supp. 1991). Moreover, the Wisconsin Rules of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys provide no exception to the requirement of confiden-
tiality for disclosures "required by law." Wis. Sup. Cr. R. 20:1.6. (West 1988).
The impact of the Wisconsin reporting provision on privileges is uncertain. Given
that the statute explicitly mentions attorneys, however, it is hard to be confident that the
intent and/or effect is not to authorize disclosure in spite of the attorney-client privilege
and ethics rules requiring confidentiality.
39. The same statutory patterns regarding the treatment of the attorney-client privi-
lege that appear in mandatory reporting statutes are replicated in statutes in which re-
porting is permissive. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (1986) ("The doctrine of privi-
leged communication, with the exception of the attorney-client privilege, shall not be
ground for excluding any evidence. . . in any judicial proceeding . . . "); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-10-112 (1986) ("The privileged communication between patient and physician,
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Currently, twenty-two states have mandatory reporting systems
applicable specifically or generally to lawyers: Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming." Of those, only four
states-Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, and Oregon-have statutes that
specifically mention lawyers as a group subject to reporting re-
quirements. The other states have statutes that in.clude lawyers
generally through language that imposes the duty on "any person"
(e.g., Texas, Rhode Island, Wyoming), or "any person, including
but not limited to" (e.g., Florida, Tennessee, Utah), or "any other
person" (e.g., Delaware, New Hampshire). In these eighteen states,
the reporting requirement-typically threatening criminal sanctions
for failure promptly to report abuse-constitutes, despite its gener-
ality, a very real duty for lawyers.4'
between patient and registered professional nurse, and between husband and wife shall
not be a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding ...."); MiCH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.631 (vest 1991) ("Any legally recognized privileged communication
except that between attorney and client is abrogated and shall neither constitute grounds
for excusing a report otherwise required to be made nor for excluding evidence in a civil
child protective proceeding ....").
The similarity in treatment of the attorney-client privilege between permissive and
mandatory reporting schemes suggests that the provisions in mandatory reporting statutes
do not contemplate eliminating protections for privileged conversations, as permissive stat-
utes clearly do not intend to require reporting by attorneys.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-103 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 903 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §
16-1619 (Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3(a) (Bums 1987); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 620.030(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-705(a)(1)
(1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711(1)
(1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2)(i) (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
169-C:39 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1-15(A) (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1989);.OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1) (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(A) (West Supp.
1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 418.740(3)(m) (Supp. 1990), 418.750 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-11-3 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.01
(Vest Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(1) (1989); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-205(a)
(1986).
I have attempted to be complete in this listing, and I believe that none of the
other states require reporting by lawyers. The analysis that follows represents an effort to
canvass the set of issues raised by these statutes. Countrywide statutory analysis has its
difficulties, and oversights are possible.
41. To date, an attorney has not been prosecuted for failure to report abuse in a
published case. Until recently, prosecution of professionals generally for failure to report
was rare. However, the numbers of prosecutions are now increasing, with the list of
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2. Treatment of Attorney-Client Privilege. Two questions
must be answered to determine how reporting statutes affect confi-
dential attorney-client communications. The first is whether the
reporting statutes abrogate or preserve the traditional evidentiary
privilege. The second is whether the attorney-client privilege, if not
abrogated by reporting laws, applies only in judicial proceedings or
extends to otherwise required out-of-court revelations, such as the
reporting of suspected abuse to law enforcement officials or social
service authorities. With these two issues in mind, the statutes may
be divided into several groups.
In the first group are the statutes in seven states that explicit-
ly address the issue whether statements within the attorney-client
privilege are excluded as a basis for knowledge of abuse that can
trigger reporting requirements. 42 The statutes in four of these
states43 not only preserve the attorney-client privilege, but also
specifically exempt from the reporting requirement any knowledge
of abuse the lawyer gains through conversations that would be
covered by the privilege if the lawyer were called to testify in judi-
cial proceedings." In contrast, the statutes in the other three
professionals who have been the subject of criminal action growing. BESHAROV, supra
note 26, at 37-39 (detailing this trend).
42. In this group, as one might imagine, are the four states, Mississippi, Nevada,
Ohio, and Oregon, that specifically single out attorneys as mandatory reporters. See supra
text following note 40. In addition, Maryland, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, three of the
states that require attorneys along with other citizens to report abuse, apparently speak
directly to interaction between the privilege and the reporting requirements.
43. These states are: Maryland, which includes attorneys along with all other citizens
as mandatory reporters, and Nevada, Ohio, and Oregon, which impose reporting duties
specifically upon attorneys.
44. The relevant portions of these statutes are given below:
Maryland (MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-705(a)(2) (1991)): A person is
not required to provide notice under paragraph (1) of this subsection:
(i) in violation of the privilege described under § 9-108 [attorney-client
privilege] of the Courts Article;
(ii) if notice would disclose matter communicated in confidence by a
client to the client's attorney or other information relating to the representation
of the client; or
(iii) in violation of any constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
Nevada (NEV. REV. -STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(2) (Michie 1991) (emphasis
added)): Reports must be made by the following persons who, in their profes-
sional or occupational capacities, know or have reason to believe that a child
has been abused or neglected:
(i) An attorney, unless he has acquired the knowledge of the abuse or ne-
glect from a client who is or may be accused of the abuse or neglect.
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states appear to abrogate the privilege. In Mississippi, the re-
porting statute declares that "reporting of an abused or neglected
child shall not constitute a breach of confidentiality";,' in New
Mexico and Oklahoma, it abrogates the "physician-patient privilege
or similar privilege or rule against disclosure."' However, whether
abrogation is intended in any of these three states becomes ques-
tionable on closer inspection.'
Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421(A)(2) (Baldwin 1987) (emphasis
added)): An attorney is not required to make a report pursuant to division
(A)(1) of this section concerning any communication made to him by one of
his clients in the attorney-client relationship, if, in accordance with division (A)
of section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, the attorney could not testify with
respect to that communication in a civil or criminal proceeding, except that the
client is deemed to have waived any testimonial privilege ... with respect to
that communication and the attorney shall make a report. . , if [the client is
a minor and appears to have been the victim of abuse].
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1985) (emphasis added)): Nothing
contained in ORS 40225 to 40.295 [evidentiary privileges] shall affect the duty
to report imposed by this section, except that a psychiatrist, psychologist, cler-
gyman or attorney shall not be required to report such information communicated
by a person if the communication is privileged under ORS 40.225-40.295.
45. MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (1972).
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-16(A) (Michie 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 848
(West Supp. 1992).
47. In Mississippi, another provision of the reporting statute appears to limit disclo-
sure to information acquired outside the scope of the traditional privilege by restricting
the reporting duties of attorneys to circumstances where, under traditional analysis, the
privilege would be found inapplicable. The effect of the statutes appears to be that a
report by an attorney is required only when based on "knowledge through observation,"
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (Supp. 1990), as opposed to knowledge through confiden-
tial conversation. Observations, as contrasted to communications, are typically not treated
as information protected by the attorney-client privilege, although in some circumstances
the conduct accompanying the observation may be sufficiently communicative to bring the
entire transaction within the privilege. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 89, at 125-26
(John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992) (client rolling up sleeve to reveal a hidden sear
or opening a drawer to display a weapon treated' as protected communication rather than
unprotected observation). Unfortunately, however, no judicial opinion has construed the
Mississippi statutory structure.
In New Mexico and Oklahoma, the statutory language, which abrogates the "phy-
sician-patient privilege or similar privilege," should likely not be construed to include the
attorney-client privilege. Given the general development of reporting statutes from early
models that covered only doctors or focused on them most directly, the language is both
understandable and unrelated to the attorney-client privilege. In fact, this language on
abrogation of privilege is taken directly from the Council of State Governments model
act that required reporting only by medical personnel. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERN-
mENTS, supra note 21, at 67; for text of provision, see supra note 35. Moreover, a con-
temporary analysis of the model act's language contained no hint that it was intended to
apply to attorney-client privilege. CHILDREN'S DIVISION, supra note 24, at 31 (noting that
it might be argued that "or similar privilege" applied to husband-wife privilege, which
was frequently abrogated by statutes in other states but that if strictly interpreted would
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Statutes in a second group of five states' explicitly abrogate
certain privileges yet retain others, including the attorney-client
privilege, and these statutes thus unmistakably preserve the tradi-
tional evidentiary privilege. These statutes also state that when
abrogating privileges they intend to cover both the evidentiary use
of confidential information in judicial proceedings and the duty to
report."9 Whether the statutes positively exempt confidences pro-
tected by the attorney-client- privilege from reporting requirements
depends upon whether they intend to accomplish both their affir-
matively stated purpose when they abrogate privileges and their
inverse when they preserve them: Since the statutes when eliminat-
ing privileges explicitly do so for both reporting and testimonmy,
do they likewise intend that those privileges explicitly preserved
shield against required reporting as well as testimony? Although
an argument may be made for this broad interpretation of the
statutory language preserving the attorney-client privilege, its merit
is hardly compelling.
A third group of seven states abrogates some privileges but
retains others, including the attorney-client privilege.' In contrast
apply only to similar medical privileges, such as nurse-patient). But see Besharov, supra
note 22, at 478 & n.124 (listing New Mexico and Oklahoma as states that by this legisla-
tion apparently abrogated the attorney-client privilege),
However, standard legislative intent analysis, which often begins and ends with the
literal language of an apparently unambiguous statute, might conclude that the attorney-
client privilege was eliminated since its operation is similar to the physician-patient priv-
ilege. In New Mexico and Oklahoma, like Mississippi, the statutory structure has not re-
ceived judicial interpretation.
48. In this group are Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and, with a
small variation, Indiana. See infra note 49.
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.512 (West 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2)
(Baldwin Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40-11-11 (1990).
The treatment of privileges under these statutes follows two second-generation
model acts that were developed in the mid-1970s. See supra note 32. The Rhode Island
provision is typical of the group:
The privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and any
professional person and his or her patient or client, except that between attorney
and client, is hereby abrogated in situations involving known or suspected child
abuse or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as re-
quired by this chapter, failure to cooperate with the department in its activities
pursuant to this chapter, or failure to give or accept evidence in any judicial
proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.
ILL. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1990) (emphasis added).
The statutory pattern in Indiana differs in that, while not explicitly preserving the
attorney-client privilege, it specifically abrogates several other privileges as to both report-
ing and testifying. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-8 (Burns 1987).
50. Four states, Delaware, Idaho, Texas, and Wyoming, fit this pattern perfectly. The
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to the second group described above, these statutes abrogate the
other privileges only with regard to the receiving of evidence in
judicial proceedings. 1 Thus, in these states, the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege is preserved, but the statutes do not indicate
whether that privilege should at all constrain the operation of
reporting requirements.
The final group of three states52 cannot be categorized. In
these, the intent of the reporting statutes is so murky that nothing
can confidently be said regarding the preservation or abrogation of
the attorney-client privilege as applied to either in-court or out-of-
court disclosures. 3
other three, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee, preserve privileges only by impli-
cation. In these three states, the attorney-client privilege is omitted from a specific listing
of other privileges that are abrogated. Under the general principle of statutory interpreta-
tion expressio unius est exclusio alterius, these omitted privileges are preserved. See 2A
SUTE RLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (singer 5th ed. 1992).
51. These seven states can usefully be divided into two subgroups. See supra note 50.
In the first are Delaware, Idaho, Texas, and Wyoming. DEL. CODE ANN.'tit. 16, § 908
(1983); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (West
1986); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-210 (1986).
The Delaware statute is typical of this first subgroup:
The physician-patient privilege, husband-wife privilege or any privilege except the
attorney-client privilege, provided for by professions such as social work or nurs-
ing, covered by law or a code of ethics regarding practitioner-client confidences,
both as they relate to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of
evidence, shall not pertain in any civil or criminal litigation in which a person's
neglect, abuse, dependency, exploitation or abandonment is in issue nor in any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report submitted pursuant to this chapter.
DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1983) (emphasis added).
The second subgroup consists of Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-714 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-551 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. §
37-1-411 (1991).
The North Carolina statute is typical of the second subgroup:
Neither the physician-patient privilege, the psychologist-client privilege, nor the
husband-wife privilege shall be grounds for excluding evidence of abuse or
neglect in any judicial proceeding (civil, criminal, or juvenile) in which a
juvenile's abuse or neglect is in issue nor in any judicial proceeding resulting
from a report submitted under this Article, both as said privileges relate to the
competency of the witness and to the exclusion of confidential communications.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-551 (1989).
52. These states include Connecticut, New Jersey, and Utah. See infra note 53.
53. Connecticut and New Jersey child abuse reporting statutes contain no explicit
basis for either the abrogation or the preservation of any privilege. The law concerning
the attorney-client privilege is equally silent. In Connecticut, the privilege is governed by
common law. Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989). In New
Jersey, the privilege is defined by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20 (West 1976),
which is a basic statement of the privilege as developed at common law without a special
provision applicable to child abuse cases.
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C. Preliminary Conclusions Regarding Impact of Reporting
The reporting statutes in many of these twenty-two states
raise a number of issues and problems. The first level of concern
is one of simple statutory intent. What did these statutes mean to
accomplish with regard to the reporting of child abuse by attor-
neys?
1. A Reporting Requirement Applicable to Lawyers. One
conclusion is indisputable. These statutes intended that lawyers be
required to report child abuse. In their modern formulation, re-
porting requirements have a uniformly broad focus that extends
beyond the medical profession. In a handful of states, lawyers as a
profession are specifically identified as having a duty to report,
and in a larger number, they are treated as all other citizens. Law-
yers in all of these states receive no blanket exemption from the
commands of the law and thus are required to report abuse in
some instances. ' The issue in many states is whether that respon-
Several different interpretations are possible. One plausible argument is that in the
absence of an expressed intent otherwise, an important legal principle like the attorney-
client privilege should be presumed to continue. Alternatively, the clear command of the
reporting statutes may be held to apply and abrogate the privilege if the reporting provi-
sions were enacted more recently than the privilege. Besharov, supra note 22, at 477.
Utah's statutory structure presents an unusual case. Its statute specifically exempts
from the reporting requirement information received by the clergy during confession,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(2), (3) (1989), and it abrogates doctor-patient privilege,
although mentioning only abrogation with regard to testimony, id. § 62A-4-513(4). De-
spite this specific treatment of other professional privileges, the statute is silent with
respect to the attorney-client privilege. The statutory silence is ambiguous. On the one
hand, silence might be interpreted to mean that the attorney-client privilege is preserved
given its omission from the list of privileges to be abrogated. See supra note 50. On the
other hand, since the clergyman-penitent privilege is specifically preserved, silence regard-
ing the attorney-client privilege also means it has been omitted as well from a list of re-
tained privileges, possibly signifying an intent to abrogate.
A peculiar legislative history with regard to the clergyman-penitent privilege ex-
plains its inclusion in the statute, but hardly resolves the problem of interpreting the
statute's silence on the attorney-client privilege. In 1983, the Attorney General of Utah
issued an opinion that the then-existing clergyman-penitent privilege did not apply outside
judicial proceedings and provided no protection against required reporting of child abuse.
Op. Utah Att'y Gan. No. 82-87 (Feb. 17, 1983). The opinion stated that the situation
could be corrected only by legislative action. Id. The legislature subsequently amended
the law to exempt the clergy from reporting requirements where the information is ob-
tained through a confession of the perpetrator but to require reporting if the information
is obtained otherwise. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(2), (3) (1989).
54. The breadth of reporting duties can be breathtaking. For example, in Gross v.
Myers, 748 P.2d 459 (Mont. 1987), the Supreme Court of Montana in the context of civil
litigation affirmed the judgment of the trial court that a social worker was subject to the
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sibility is limited by traditional protections of the attorney-client
privilege when information regarding abuse was obtained in the
course of legal representation of a client.
2. Preservation or Abrogation of Attorney-Client Privilege. A
second conclusion is generally, although not perhaps universally,
valid. Most reporting statutes exhibit no intent to abrogate the
attorney-client privilege. Thirteen states by explicit statement55
and three more by implication' preserve the attorney-client privi-
lege in connection with the reporting of child abuse and/or litiga-
tion of child abuse cases. In the remaining six states, with the
possible exception of Mississippi, it is hard to find any evidence of
an intention to abrogate the attorney-client privilege.
Given the particular history of this type of legislation, which
demonstrates no substantial voice for abrogating the attorney-client
privilege, the silence of some statutes regarding preservation of the
privilege should not be read implicitly as rejecting it. Indeed, in
this historical context, even the overbroad language in the New
Mexico and Oklahoma statutes apparently abrogating all privileg-
es5 should not be read as eliminating the attorney-client privilege.
Several notes of caution are in order, however. Legal history
is filled with important legislative developments that were not
explicitly intended,5 8 and in accordance with basic principles of
legislative interpretation, courts will generally ignore an intent not
reflected by the words of a statute. 9 In particular, courts in New
reporting mandate cif the law. The information involved sexual abuse that had occurred
sixteen years earlier, which might indicate a present threat of harm because the perpe-
trator might now victimize his grandchildren. Id. at 460-62.
55. Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,' Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Oregon, Nevada, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming. See supra notes 44, 49, 51.
56. These three states are Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee. See supra notes
50-51.
57. See. supra note 46 and accompanying text.
58. Even within the limited area of compelled disclosures from attorneys, an example
of such apparently unintended results exists. Lawyers who receive physical evidence of
their client's crime may be subject to prosecution for failure to deliver that evidence to
police authorities. The statute that creates the legal duty is a general one covering tam-
pering with physical evidence, which is patterned on the Model Penal Code that itself
indicates no intention to cover criminal defense attorneys. However, the language is po-
tentially broad enough to encompass failure to disclose by the attorney, and it has been
so interpreted. Norman Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney's
Dilemma, and the Need for Rules, 64 N.C. L. REV. 897, 919-20 (1986).
59. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcION, supra note 50, § 46.03 (courts are
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Mexico and Oklahoma may read their state statutes as abrogating
the attorney-client privilege. More generally, where a reporting
statute is entirely silent on the treatment of the attorney-client
privilege, some ambiguity exists as to whether abrogation of the
attorney-client privilege was intended by the legislature.60 Statutes
in several states should be amended to clear up such ambiguity.
II. THE APPLICATION OF ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO OUT-OF-COURT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
OF CHILD ABUSE REPORTING STATUTES
Assuming, as argued above, that the attorney-client privilege
is preserved in its generally accepted form, the immediate issue is
the impact of the privilege upon the duty to report child abuse.
The problem is squarely presented by a statutory structure such as
that in Delaware, which preserves the attorney-client privilege
without making any reference to the impact of the privilege on
reporting duties.'
Does this. statutory pattern mean that information gained
through communications that would be covered by the attorney-
client privilege if the lawyer were called as a witness to testify
may not be the basis for required reporting of child abuse? Stated
differently, does the privilege bar in-court testimony exclusively or
does it protect against compelled out-of-court disclosures as well?
The significance of these questions should be obvious for the inter-
pretation of the reporting requirements. If the privilege protects
to apply the expressed intent of statute); id. § 46.04 (courts bound to give effect to liter-
al meaning of statute's language without consulting other indicia of intent).
60. In the related area of clergyman-penitent privilege, abrogation was found based
on the failure explicitly to preserve the privilege, the apparent clarity of the application
of the reporting requirement to the clergy, and the fact that the reporting requirement
was passed after the legislation establishing the clergyman-penitent privilege. Op. Tex.
Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985); David T. Fenton, Note, Texas' Clergyman-Penitent
Privilege and the Duty to Report Suspected Child Abuse, 38 BAYLOR L. REv. 231 (1986).
Cf. Human Servs., Inc. v. Woodward, 765 P.2d 1052, 1054-55 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988)
(social worker privilege not abrogated by provisions of child abuse reporting statute be-
cause enacted after abuse reporting act).
The statutory pattern present in Texas regarding the clergyman-penitent privilege is
not generally found with regard to the attorney-client privilege. The above reasoning is
thus inapplicable to states like Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee. It may, howev-
er, have application in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Utah, although in the latter the
legislative history complicates analysis. See supra note 53.
61. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 908 (1983). On this issue, the same legislative pattern
also exists in Idaho, Texas, and Wyoming. See supra, note 51.
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only against in-court disclosures, then a reporting requirement
applied to lawyers and the attorney-client privilege do not directly
conflict; the privilege is not violated by reporting requirements,
which compel disclosures that are beyond the scope of the privi-
lege.'
In this Part, I examine whether the attorney-client privilege
applies to out-of-court disclosures.' Remarkably, the issue is not
clearly answered by established law.' The reason that the privi-
lege has not been explicitly recognized to cover state-mandated
out-of-court reporting appears not to have been the result of any
62. However, although the concepts have legally distinct foundations, it may not be
so certain that the attorney-client privilege can be separated from the confidentiality
principle of rules of professional responsibility with regard to interpretation of legislative
intent. At least as used popularly or colloquially, some authorities suggest that "the privi-
lege" may be taken to mean some combination of the two concepts. NORMAN REDLICH,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIrY: A PROBLEM APPROACH 10 (2d ed. 1983); Jennifer
Cunningham, Note, Eliminating "Backdoor" Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the
Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 999
(1990). Courts and other authorities commonly mingle the two concepts uncritically. 1
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.6:108, at 142.2 (2d
ed. Supp. 1991). However, notwithstanding this occasional careless commingling of the
two concepts, there is no evidence that legislatures purposefully or inadvertently encom-
passed the confidentiality principle embodied in the ethics rules within the protection
afforded under the attorney-client privilege.
63. An examination of the more fundamental issues regarding the theoretical under-
pinnings of the law of privilege and how the privilege should be defined is undertaken
later in Parts IV and V.
64. Indeed, some scholars appear simply to assume the privilege applies. See J. Mi-
chael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality:
Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 340
(1976) (making extremely broad claim for scope of attorney-client privilege that would
clearly apply it in compelled reporting circumstances). Others, however, recognize the
issue as an undecided one. See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Excep-
tion to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV.
443, 494 (1986) (because privilege determined in context of adversary proceeding in
courtroom, it is impossible to say whether it exists outside that context); Mitchell, supra
note 22, at 787 (authorities inconclusive); Robert Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confiden-
tiality Laws and State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for
Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 158-59 (1984) (whether privilege applies only to
restrict production of testimony in judicial proceedings is a rarely discussed issue as to
which the answer is unclear). Still others give conflicting answers. See 24 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVI-
DENCE 436 (1986) ("[I]t is generally understood that the privilege does not govern extra-
judicial disclosures by the attorney."). But see id. at 426 (privilege covers situations such
as disclosure of information gained pursuant to a search warrant by exercise of govern-
mental power outside the courtroom).
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theoretical limitation on the privilege but rather the result of there
being virtually no occasion for the extension. Lawyers are rarely
compelled to 'divulge client confidences by statutes that require
out-of-court disclosures.' Child abuse reporting requirements pro-
vide one of the few modem examples of such compulsion.'
A. Existing Authorities Cast Little Light on the Propriety of
Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege to Out-of-Court
Disclosures Requirements
Direct authorities on this aspect of the scope of the privilege
are scattered, inconclusive, and unimpressive. The existing opinions
are -frequently of little value because they generally have dealt
with privileges other than the attorney-client privilege 67 -the legis-
65. The requirement of the Internal Revenue Code that lawyers furnish information
when a client pays the lawyer more than $10,000 in cash, 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. II
1990), like child abuse reporting statutes, compels such disclosures. Courts have typically
found that the statute does not violate the attorney-client privilege because the disclosure
does not involve a confidential communication for legal advice, see, e.g., United States v.
Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504-05 (2d Cir. 1991), a conclusion that is
unsound theoretically when made as a matter of definition. See Steven Goode, Identity,
Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307, 346-48 (1991) (con-
cluding that a blanket exclusion of fee information from attorney-client privilege is erro-
neous because in some cases the information is indeed intended to be confidential and its
disclosure would reveal legitimate legal communications); see also David F. DuMouchel &
Cynthia J.H. Oberg, Defense Attorney Fees: A New Tool for the Prosecution, 1 DET. C.L.
REV. 57, 75-78 (1986) (making strident assertion that disclosure requirements "impinge
upon and may directly violate" attorney-client relationship); Catherine A. Earl, Note, Will
This Be Cash? The Validity of Internal Revenue Code Section 60501 and the Attorney.
Client Relationship, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 893 (1988) (analyzing issues of attorney-client
privilege, professional ethics, and constitutional rights implicated by cash reporting re-
quirement). However, the claim that the statute avoids conflict with the privilege because
it requires only out-of-court disclosures does not appear to have been made.
66. The basic principle at work in the child abuse reporting statutes has a counter-
part in the ancient crime of misprision of a felony. For a discussion of misprision and
some of the differences between it and contemporary reporting statutes, see infra note
209.
67. Attorney general opinions from Utah and Wisconsin construe other evidentiary
privileges as limited to testimony in judicial proceedings. Op. Utah Att'y Gen. No. 82-87
(Feb. 17, 1983) (state clergyman-penitent privilege protects against compelled testimony in
judicial proceedings but does not prevent required reporting of child abuse); Op. Wis.
Att'y Gen. No. 10-87 (Mar. 16, 1987) (physician-patient privilege does not prohibit disclo-
sure of confidential communications outside of evidentiary court proceeding). The inter-
mediate appellate court in Alaska reached a similar result for the physician-patient privi-
lege, although its analysis rested in part on the limited authorization given to the state
supreme court to promulgate privilege rules. That authorization extended exclusively to
judicial proceedings. The same limitation was not necessarily applicable to the attorney-
client privilege, which has a broader basis for its existence. Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d
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lative authorization for creation of which, unlike the broader au-
thorization for the attorney-client privilege, is limited only to judi-
cial proceedings.' Be that as it may, several authorities flatly as-
sert in terms that appear generally applicable to all evidentiary
695, 697-98 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
The only clear authority for an extension of the privilege to out-of-court disclosures
is found in an intermediate appellate court opinion from Maryland. See Shaw v.
Glickman, 415 A.2d 625, 630 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (finding that privilege applicable
to psychiatrist or psychologist prohibited disclosure of information out-of-court regarding
dangerousness of patient: "It seems to us that inasmuch as the statute confers a privilege
of confidentiality on the communication between patient and psychiatrist-psychologist in
judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings . . . , no lesser privilege is existent
when the matter is not judicial, legislative, or administrative."). On the basis of this opin-
ion, the Maryland Attorney General's Office reversed a previously expressed opinion that
privileges did not constrain reporting requirements. Compare 74 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 128
(1989) with 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 157 (1977).
While the specific issue of the out-of-court application of the privilege was not
examined directly, People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Co. Ct.), affd mem., 376 N.Y.S.2d
771 (App. Div. 1975), affd per curiam, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976), also supports the
position that the privilege applies to disclosure requirements. In that case, attorney Beige,
who had been told of the location of murder victims by his client, was charged with a
criminal offense under the public health laws for failure to provide a report to proper
authorities of the death. 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799. The trial court concluded that because
Beige had learned of the location of the bodies through a conversation falling within the
attorney-client privilege, that privilege in combination with the client's Fifth Amendment
right meant that Beige could not be prosecuted under the make-weight statutory offense
charged. Id. at 802-03. The result was supported by a state ethics opinion that, like the
trial court opinion, acknowledged no real issue as to the out-of-court application of the
privilege. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978), reprinted
in N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1978, at 24. The ethics opinion concluded that, under the confidenti-
ality principles of the attorney-client privilege and the ethics rules, a lawyer "was duty-
bound not to reveal to the authorities the location of the bodies." Id; see also Indianapo-
lis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (Apr. 29, 1986) (assuming application of
privilege to child abuse out-of-court reporting requirements).
Beige undeniably supports the out-of-court application of the attorney-client privi-
lege in the face of a reporting statute. Its value as precedent is limited, however, by the
very strong support for protection provided by.the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights'of
the client. The client had already been formally charged with one murder, and the
lawyer's information about the other crimes had a potential impact upon the client's
insanity defense in that already commenced prosecution. Thus, the privilege in Beige did
not have to stand alone. That fact, in combination with the weakness of the statutory
disclosure requirement involved in the offense of failing to disclose known deaths, means
that the question of out-of-court application of the attorney-client privilege was hardly
given a real test.
68. See Walstad, 818 P.2d at 697 & n.2 (noting that psychotherapist-patient and cler-
gyman-penitent privileges were promulgated by state supreme court pursuant to its au-
thority to make rules governing procedure in civil and criminal cases and do not rest on
any independent basis, in contrast to the attorney-client privilege which is "inextricably
tied to the constitutional right to counsel").
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privileges that they have no impact on reporting statutes.0 If this
conclusion is correct for evidentiary privileges generally and appli-
cable to the attorney-client privilege particularly," reporting stat-
utes have an extremely significant impact on client confidences.
However, because the authorities are so limited, analysis of them
alone can produce no firm resolution of the issue. Nevertheless,
they do demonstrate that whether the attorney-client privilege
applies at all to reporting statutes is a live issue.
B. Contemporary Expansions of the Privilege Lend Support to Its
Application to Out-of-Court Disclosure Requirements
A potentially more fruitful mode of addressing the issue is to
examine other expansions of the attorney-client privilege during
the second half of the twentieth century and to analyze the impli-
cations of the general principles recognized as justifying the privi-
lege. The privilege is now accepted as extending beyond judicial
proceedings, where it began, to administrative and legislative pro-
ceedings, as well as to production of evidence for a grand jury.
Further extension of the privilege to protect against required dis-
closure of information in response to state compulsion would ap-
pear to be consistent with these earlier types of developments in
the law of privilege z where extension is necessary to the preser-
69. See Op. Utah Att'y Gen. No. 82-87 (Feb. 17, 1983); Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. No.
10-87 (Mar. 16, 1987).
70. The response that the attorney-client privilege is basically different from other
privileges in that it has a constitutional basis is not satisfactory. As discussed more fully
below in Section IV(C), the constitutional underpinning for the attorney-client privilege is
very limited and cannot generally justify treating it differently than other evidentiary
privileges, some of which themselves have at least arguable constitutional support. See In
re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68 (Cal. 1970) (client's interest in confidentiality of pa-
tient-psychiatrist privilege has some constitutional basis in right of privacy); Mitchell,
supra note 22 (arguing for constitutional basis for clergyman-penitent privilege).
71. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 6.3.4, at 255 (Practitioner's
ed. 1986) (noting that it is now generally accepted that governmentally coerced revela-
tions before grand jury and administrative hearings fall within privilege); see also 1 SARA
S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE § 6.23, at 141
(1986) (noting that witness can lawfully resist any subpoena on the ground that it calls
for material protected by recognized evidentiary privilege, including attorney-client privi-
lege). Only a few decades ago, these issues were in stibstantial doubt. See Annotation,
Physician-Patient, Attorney-Client, or Priest-Penitent Privilege as Applicable in Nonjudicial
Proceeding or Investigation, 133 A.L.R. 732 (1941).
72. Professor Hazard argues that the attorney-client privilege developed to avoid an
anomaly in the law. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (1978). At the time of the development of
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vation of the confidential relationship.' An analogy may also be
drawn to the well-recognized principle that an attorney may not
defeat the privilege indirectly by transmitting a statement regarding
a client's confidential communication through a third party 4
C. Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to Out-of-Court Disclo-
sure Requirements Is Consistent with Its Underlying Theory
As developed more fully in Part IV, privileges are primarily
supported in contemporary legal theory by a utilitarian theory."
the privilege, a party could not testify, even if called as an adverse witness. The privilege
was developed, it appears, to prevent the obtaining of information from a party's attor-
ney that is not obtainable directly from the party. Id
As to an ancient counterpart to child abuse reporting laws, misprision of a felony,
the English authorities .were not worried by the suggestion that the attorney-client privi-
lege would provide a defense for failure to report a known crime. Sykes v. Director of
Pub. Prosecution, [1962] A.C. 528, 564 (1961) (Lord Denning). For a more complete dis-
cussion of the implications of misprision to the current issue, see infra note 209.
73. The broad reading of the Fifth Amendment in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), supports the expansion of attorney-client privilege to protect against compulsion
occurring outside the courtroom. Miranda determined that police questioning in a custodi-
al setting constitutes compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This out-
of-court pressure has been called "informal compulsion" because, prior to that decision,
the Fifth Amendment had been applied only in contexts of formal legal compulsion oc-
curring in the courtroom.
Although this expanded reading of the Fifth Amendment constituted a significant
change in the law, the extension of the concept of compulsion to events occurring out-
side the courtroom had an arguable basis in both the policy and history of the amend-
ment. As with the traditional limitation of the attorney-client privilege to the courtroom
setting, the initial recognition of compulsion only in formal legal compulsion was a result
of the historical pattern in which compulsion was typically exerted. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436-39 (1987). Thus, the
acknowledgement that constitutionally recognizable compulsion can and does occur outside
a judicial proceeding supports a similar expansion of the attorney-client privilege under
common law principles to include out-of-court disclosures required by statute. Certainly,
the sufficiency of the legal compulsion cannot be in doubt when based on a reporting
statute backed by criminal sanctions, as contrasted to that somewhat more problematic
additional element of the Miranda decision. See Schulhofer, supra, at 440-53 (discussing
issue of whether interrogation constitutes compulsion).
74. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2325, at 632; see also Himmelfarb v. United States,
175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949) (noting that admission of evidence voluntarily disclosed
by attorney would violate privilege as much as attorney's testimony on stand), cert. de-
nied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client
Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1985) ("Strictly speaking, the
privilege is not relevant to the attorney's out-of-court treatment of client confidences. But
it always has been understood that if attorneys were free to divulge confidences out of
court that were protected by the privilege in court, the privilege would be of limited
value, if not useless.").
75. Professor Wigmore, who is largely responsible for both the contemporary under-
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Under this theory, confidentiality is necessary to encourage full
disclosure of information, which is deemed useful in furthering a
valuable social goal. The implications of a utilitarian theory
strongly support the protection of out-of-court disclosures.
Building the concept of evidentiary privileges on a utilitarian
theoretical basis has consequences for the nature of the doctrine
created.76 In specific, since a privilege is designed to enhance so-
cial good by encouraging candor in communication, it needs to
operate clearly and explicitly.' It is very difficult to see how full
disclosure by the client can be fostered under an assurance of
confidentiality if "confidentiality" means that the damaging infor-
mation may be transmitted to the state under reporting require-
ments and used to investigate and prosecute the client." Even if
the state is ultimately prohibited from calling the lawyer as a wit-
ness at the client's trial, the major damage would have been
done, 9 and the promise of secrecy, compromised in this important
standing and the misunderstanding of the privilege, 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
64, § 5472, at 71-79, attributes the early non-utilitarian basis of the privilege to principles
of professional honor and asserts that those non-utilitarian justifications are no longer rec-
ognized as a basis for the privilege. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2290, at 543-45; id. §
2291.
Support for some variant of a non-utilitarian theory of the privilege, which I de-
scribe in Part IV as a rights-based theory, has probably always been stronger and more
complex than Wigmore acknowledged. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 208, at 731-32 (1985); 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 64, § 5472, at 76-79. Accepting another rationale would have an impact on the
shape of the privilege developed. The point of the above argument is not that no other
rationale can be imagined or supported. Rather, it is that, if courts accept the utilitarian
rationale as the dominant theoretical justification of contemporary evidentiary privileges,
then extending protection to out-of-court disclosures compelled by the state is highly con-
sistent with the theory of the privilege. The extension would also be supported by some
alternative theories of the privilege, particularly certain versions of a rights-based priv-
ilege.
76. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 5472, at 86.
77. Id.
78. Some commentators have argued that competing interests should be reconciled by
permitting disclosures to be used only for the purpose of protecting the child. See, e.g.,
Nancy E. Stuart, Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidenti-
ality, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243, 258 (1987) (arguing that courts should impose man-
datory duty on attorneys to report but to limit reporting to initial report going to civil
authorities only). For the most part, these recommendations have not been followed. See,
e.g., People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725, 729 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding purpose of re-
porting statutes not merely to remove victim from harm but also to aid in prosecution of
perpetrator) (citing People v. Battaglia, 203 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Ct. App. 1984)). Howev-
er, there are some exceptions. See infra notes 89-90.
79. People v. Morton, 543 N.E.2d 1366, 1373 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (if therapist re-
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way, would prove ineffective in facilitating open and free confiding
of sensitive information.'
Indeed, if statements made by a client are known to be sub-
ject to mandatory disclosure to third parties, then the privilege is
wholly destroyed. In fact, the privilege will never come into exis-
tence because statements are privileged only if they are intended
to be kept confidential." If a client knows that his statements will
be disclosed, he cannot have the intent of keeping the statements
confidential. Moreover, if the law requires disclosure, many law-
yers will inform their clients that the attorney-client privilege does
not cover statements revealing possible abuse; indeed, they may be
quired to report conversation to state social services department, incentive to speak ac-
curately is virtually eliminated even if conversation is not admissible in court), appeal
denied, 550 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. 1990); Phyllis Coleman, Creating Therapist-Incest Offender
Exception to Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes-When Psychiatrist Knows Best,
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113, 1140 n.126 (1986) (arguing that privilege from testimony is not
the important issue because if the psychiatrist is required to report any sexual abuse dis-
closed by the patient the harm has already occurred); Mitchell, supra note 22, at 790
(arguing that "[i]f the rationale for the privilege is the concern with privacy for intimate
relationships, that privacy is shattered by compelled disclosures in the form of a report as
much as by compelled disclosures in a courtroom") (footnote omitted).
80. In a related context, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently recognized that
legislation granting to sexual assault counselors a privilege not "to be examined in any
court or criminal proceeding," 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1(b)(1) (Supp. 1992),
must be extended to subpoenas for records and other documents developed in the coun-
seling relationship. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Pa. 1992). Otherwise,
the court observed, the confidentiality which the statute purports to provide to the state-
ments of the rape victim would cease to exist and insulating the counsel from giving
testimony would be inconsequential. Id. Wilson shows that courts recognize their ability
to extend the protections of a statutorily defined privilege beyond its literal bounds when
they believe it necessary to satisfy the underlying purpose animating the creation of the
privilege.
81. See, e.g., 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 91, at 333 ("It is of the
essence of the privilege that it is limited to those communications which the client either
expressly made confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circumstances
would be understood by the attorney as so intended.").
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ethically obligated to do so. ' Then, not even the in-court privi-
lege will apply to the statements.?
Unfortunately, subtle issues such as the application of the
privilege to statutorily mandated out-of-court disclosures, on a
subject as complicated and conflicting as privilege, can rarely be
decided on the basis of fundamental principles alone. This is par-
ticularly true when the fundamental principles themselves are
subject to debate.
We have long recognized that the utilitarian theoretical basis
for the attorney-client privilege rests on an uncertain foundation.
Little empirical evidence exists on the question of whether individ-
uals confide critical information about themselves in reliance on
the fact that the information will be protected by privilege.' As
well, we are not inevitably committed to the utilitarian rationale
for the privilege and may, if we choose, blend it with aspects of a
non-utilitarian theory that could permit explicit recognition of im-
perfect protection of confidences.'
82. See Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Con-
fidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 441 (1990) (arguing that while not constitutionally re-
quired to do so, attorney has a moral duty to inform client of limits of confidentiality so
that client can. gauge the costs and benefits of full disclosure); Roy M. Sobelson, Law-
yers,- Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without Speaking, Clients
Hearing Without Listening, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (1988) (arguing that attorneys
are ethically obligated to explain confidentiality rules to clients and that, given the sub-
stantial number of exceptions, the limitations on confidentiality should be carefully and
sensitively explained). Cf. Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 90-007 (Feb. 8, 1990) (discussing
letter that director of clinic for sexual disorders sent to prospective clients warning that
disclosure of child sexual abuse would be reported under some circumstances to state
authorities). For a discussion of the proposal that Miranda-type warnings should be given,
see Fried, supra note 64, at 491 n.270; W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional
Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in
a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 786-87 (1981).
83. See Morton, 543 N.E.2d at 1373 (noting that therapist advised client that under
law, conversation was not confidential); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 514 A.2d 890, 895 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (defendant "on notice from the law" that statements could be used in
court proceedings and had no privilege of confidentiality); see also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVi-
DENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND FOR STATE COURTS I 503(a)(4)[01]
(1991) (statements by client that are anticipated to be disclosed in court documents not
confidential and therefore not privileged).
84. See infra note 166.
85. Cf 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 87, at 316-17 (noting that
current state of the law under which the privilege is supported by an amalgam of justifi-
cations is not conducive of predictability in application of the privilege that is logically
indispensable under a utilitarian rationale).
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Moreover, even if we accept generally the utilitarian rationale,
we remain uncertain that the goals furthered by the most extreme
applications of privilege are worth the price paid.' Our society
recognizes important competing values besides the preservation of
confidences and the improvement in legal representation engen-
dered by such preservation. The most obvious competing goal is
that of reaching the correct determination in litigation-privilege
often stands directly in the way of that accurate determination by
restricting access to truthful and valuable information.
As a consequence of both our uncertainty about the utility of
privileges and our recognition of their explicit costs, we frequently
limit the scope of privileges short of their logical conclusions.'
One limitation most relevant to the issue of child abuse reporting
is the proposition that evidence obtained indirectly through use of
the confidential communication, termed "derivative use," is not
excluded. There is no "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine appli-
cable to privileges because the underlying policy supporting them
is not sufficiently strong to bear its very substantial costs.'
Recognition of non-utilitarian justification for privileges, depending upon the precise
dimensions of that rationale, could have a number of other important consequences for
the shape of the privilege itself, such as curtailing the privilege for corporations, extend-
ing privileges to relationships more intimate than that of attorney and client, and wrest-
ing control of the privilege from the client. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 64,
§ 5472, at 79. Although some of the modifications in the privilege that would flow from
a change in theory would be congenial to majority sentiments, others tend to be some-
what subversive and therein lies at least part of the explanation for why the utilitarian
theory has remained dominant. Id.
86. As Wigmore conceded with regard to the attorney-client privilege: "Its benefits
are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete." 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 16, § 2291, at 554.
87. Wigmore also observed that, as a consequence of our recognition of the substan-
tial costs of the privilege, it is generally accepted that the privilege "ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." Id.
Courts quickly cite this argument when giving the privilege a narrow scope. See, e.g., In
re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
As discussed more fully infra in Sections IV(A) and IV(B), proponents of the
privilege argue that it is supportable both for the utilitarian reasons that Wigmore accept-
ed and on the basis of an additional rights-based argument that serves the goal of indi-
vidual autonomy.
88. SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (attorney-client
privilege does not enjoy a "level in the hierarchy of values" to justify suppressing "fruits"
of its violation); Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, 699 n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (express-
ing considerable doubt that "fruits" of violation of privilege should be suppressed); 2
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 83, 512103] (generally courts will admit fruits of
matters improperly revealed under influence of "general policy in favor of truth rather
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Within the field of child abuse itself, courts in several jurisdic-
tions have in fact concluded that privilege laws can tolerate limit-
ed-purpose disclosure. They have recognized that although disclo-
sure of abuse is required under the reporting statutes, privilege
laws for other professionals may continue to prohibit admission of
the confidential conversations in judicial proceedings,89 acknowl-
edging that the law requires the courts to pursue multiple, some-
times conflicting, policies.'
In spite of these decisions, reconciling such a "compromise"
between revelation and disclosure with the theory of privilege re-
mains problematic. Limitations in the use of the information may
have an appropriate role in softening the punitive aspects of our
child abuse laws that may, for example, interrupt valuable treat-
ment relationships or precipitate family disintegration.91 Those
than exclusion"). Cf United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077-80 (9th Cir. 1985)
(violation of attorney-client privilege by disclosures secured from defendant's former attor-
ney by government agent does not compel dismissal of charges even though disclosures
may have encouraged continued investigation and indictment of defendant). The authori-
ties on this issue are hardly so numerous or substantial that the law can be characterized
as firmly settled. However, nonrecognition of the "fruits" concept represents the dominant
contemporary judicial position.
89. See State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269, 280-81 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (holding that ab-
rogation of physician-patient privilege in child abuse reporting statute applied only to
child protection proceedings and not to criminal prosecutions); State v. Sypult, 800
S.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Ark. 1990) (language in reporting statute admitting evidence in spite
of physician-patient privilege construed to permit use of facts required by report but did
not permit discovery of patient's statements to doctor); People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725,
729 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (reporting requirement and privilege for statements to social
worker "reconciled" by permitting report but excluding testimony in court); State v.
Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 132-33 (Minn. 1984) (reaching same result as in Sypult, 800
S.W.2d at 404-05).
90. Andring, 342 N.W.2d at 132-33 (recognizing that the major goal of its reporting
statute is protection of children, not punishment of offenders, and pursuing treatment as
important to future welfare of child); see also Sypult, 800 S.W.2d at 404-05 (same, fol-
lowing Andring).
91. Texas has limited the use of information provided under its abuse reporting stat-
utes to the protection of the child, not the punishment of the abuser. Dominguez v.
Kelly, 786 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that purpose of statute, which
calls for nonaccusatory reports, is to "foster protection for abused children and not to
cause penalty to others"). Cf. Daymude v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989) (statement made during court-ordered counseling with father as part of treat-
ment program for family of child found "in need of services" remained protected because
psychiatrist's privilege not abrogated beyond the purpose of the statute, which is to iden-
tify victims for immediate attention and not to prosecute alleged abusers). See generally
William W. Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV.
473 (1990) (arguing generally that Fifth Amendment privilege should be applied gener-
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limitations, however, make little if any sense in terms of encourag-
ing frank exchanges of information between a client and his law-
yer.9
D. Conclusions and Specific Applications to Reporting Statutes
Although extension of the attorney-client privilege to out-of-
court reporting requirements is hardly compelled by the above
analysis, recognizing the privilege in this context is more consistent
with the dominant underlying theory supporting privileges than is
limiting disclosure. As a result, when courts are interpreting the
law of privilege under common law principles, they should hold
that the attorney-client privilege covers otherwise compelled disclo-
sures by attorneys under child abuse reporting statutes.
In a large number of states, however, the attorney-client privi-
lege is no longer defined exclusively by the common law but is
defined by rule or statute.93 In most states, the statutory definition
of the privilege unfortunately provides no additional gloss beyond
the common law and does not speak directly to the application of
the privilege outside the courtroom.' Likewise, the specific provi-
ously to foster family reunification rather than restrictively so as to maximize prosecu-
tion); see also Besharov, supra note 5, at 554-62 (discussing unwarranted and harmful
intervention into private family matters that may result from a well-intended but
overzealous enforcement of child abuse laws).
92. Disclosure is also incompatible with the rights-based justification of the privilege
that is premised on protecting the autonomy of the client. See infra Section IV(B). The
revelation denies autonomy in that it will likely subject the client to imposition of outside
control by civil and/or criminal authorities, and the disclosure itself is against the will of,
and without the permission of, the client.
93. A substantial number of states adopted a version of either the proposed Federal
Rule 503, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-40 (1972) or Uniform Rule 502, UNIF. R. EVID. (1974) &
REV. UNIF. R. EVwD. (1986). These states include Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 2
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 83, 503[03]..
Some states that adopted a version of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not enact
a rule regarding attorney-client privilege. These states include Arizona, Colorado, Iowa,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. In many of these states, the common law definition remains.
See, e.g., Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (common law
controls privilege in Connecticut); 1 HENRY BRANDIS, JR., BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROL-
NA EVIDENCE § 62 (3d ed. 1988) (relying on caselaw, rather than statutory law, to de-
fine attorney-client privilege in North Carolina).
94. 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 83, 503[03].
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sions in reporting laws relating to privileges are of little help in
deciding the scope of the privilege. 5 On the other hand, none of
these codifications appear to prevent courts from extending the
privilege to cover state-mandated out-of-court reporting require-
ments through traditional judicial analysis.'
Under the above analysis, attorneys should be obligated to
make a report based on information covered by the traditional
attorney-client privilege in few if any of the states that require
attorneys to report abuse. Denial of the protections apparently
offered by the privilege was not specifically intended by the stat-
utes. Abrogation in the context of reporting requirements ' should
not be the product of the historical accident that privileges tradi-
tionally have only been needed to protect against compelled testi-
mony in judicial proceedings, a limitation not at all required by
the theory of the privilege itself."8
New Jersey constitutes an exception to this pattern. Its statute provides an expan-
sive scope for privileges in general that appears broad enough to cover reporting statutes.
The provision on the "Scope of the Rules" states:
The provisions of article II, Privileges, shall apply in all cases and to all pro-
ceedings, places and inquiries, whether formal, informal, public or private, as
well as to all branches of government and by whomsoever the same may be
conducted, and none of said provisions shall be subject to being relaxed.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16(1) (West 1976). The attorney-client privilege is contained
within article II, codified at id. § 2A:84A-20.
95. As noted above, those provisions might be read to suggest an extension of the
privilege to reporting requirements in Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island, but little confidence can be placed in that interpretation of the statutory
language. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. Nevertheless, these codifications, with the exception of that in New Jersey, pro-
vide no affirmative assistance to the argument that the privilege applies to required re-
porting of information outside judicial proceedings. This failure contrasts somewhat with
several of the statutory codifications of the clergyman-penitent privilege that use language
suggestive of a broader application. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 8-803 (Smith-
Hurd 1984) ("to disclose in any court, or to any administrative board or agency, or to
any public officer"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Baldwin 1979) ("any civil or
criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943
(1982) ("in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any government [sic] unit");
see also Mitchell, supra note 22, at 787-89 (most clergyman-penitent privilege statutes do
not state the scope of their application; those that do often state the scope broadly). In
these same states, either there is no codification of the attorney-client privilege at all, as
in Illinois, or the language used contains no language similarly suggestive of a broader
application. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Baldwin 1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5916 (1982).
97. Abrogation in this context may effectively mean total abrogation. See supra notes
81-83 and accompanying text.
98. One of the reasons this element of the scope of the attorney-client privilege is
not often addressed is that in most situations the attorney-client privilege is supplemented
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In this Part, I have examined the implications of the law as it
stands today regarding the interaction between reporting laws and
the attorney-client privilege, but that state of the law need not
continue. Other than some limited constitutional constraints, the
attorney-client privilege is subject to legislative change with respect
to both its overall definition and reporting requirements. New
legislative action could establish clearly and explicitly a different
set of outcomes than those developed above. In Parts IV and V, I
address the limited constitutional constraints upon legislative
change of the privilege and the considerations that should guide
any such revamping of the privilege laws. However, before pro-
ceeding to that more basic analysis, it is first useful to examine the
role of the other major body of doctrine protecting lawyer-client
confidentiality-the rules of professional ethics.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY ON ATTORNEY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, the confidentiality
of lawyer-client communications is governed by rules of profes-
sional ethics." The law of privilege and the ethical principle of
confidentiality overlap to a substantial degree, but they have dif-
ferent dimensions. In some circumstances the privilege is broader,
and in others it is narrower, than the ethical confidentiality prin-
ciple."
by bar ethics rules that require an attorney to maintain the confidentiality of information
gained through out-of-court disclosures that would be protected by the privilege. See 1
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:108, at 142.3 ("The relationship between the
attorney-client privilege and the confidentiality principle has great practical significance,
for although lawyers often assert the privilege as a matter of instinct, they are ethically
required to do so by the broader [confidentiality] principle."); see also MODEL RULES,
supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 22 ("The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in
situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion
of law .... A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or re-
quired by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.").
99. See MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 17,
Rule 1.6.
100. The question of which set of rules is broader is complicated by the fact that
different decisionmakers are involved. Commentators agree that ethics committees tend to
accord the rules of confidentiality a broad reading while courts lean toward much nar-
rower construction of similar principles under the attorney-client privilege. 24 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 5472 at 90; Subin, supra note 74, at 1098.
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The rules of professional conduct establish that an attorney
may not disclose a client's "confidential information" except in
limited circumstances, and that a lawyer violating that prohibition
is subject to discipline. 1 As defined in the ethics rules, "confi-
dential information" includes not only information protected by
the attorney-client privilege but also "other information gained in
the professional relationship that the client has requested be held
inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to the client."'" The confiden-
tiality concept also includes information gained from others beside
the client."°3 Without question, this ethical duty of confidentiality
applies outside formal judicial proceedings."
The confidentiality principle has two major exceptions applica-
ble in the child abuse reporting situations. Both of these excep-
tions typically permit, rather than require, disclosure. The first
gives the attorney discretion to reveal information when "required
by law or court order."'"5 The second gives the attorney discre-
tion to reveal confidential information about "[tihe intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime. '"" Each exception will be discussed in turn.
101. MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101(B) ("Except when permitted under DR
4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly ... [r]eveal a confidence or secret of his cli-
ent."); MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal informa-
tion relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representa-
tion, and except as stated in paragraph (b).").
102. MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101(A). The Model Rules provide a similar
but somewhat expanded definition of protected information, covering all information "re-
lating to the representation" of the client whether acquired by the attorney before or
after the relationship began and providing protection without regard to whether the client
indicated the information was to be confidential. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6
& cmt. at 25-26.
103. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 22.
104. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:108, at 142.2.
105. MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101(C)(2). The Model Rules do not contain
such a provision, although the commentary states that "[tihe lawyer must comply with
the final orders of a court . . . ." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 25.
Thus, Professors Hazard and Hodes argue, such an exception must be read into the
Model Rules. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:112.
106. MODEL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101(C)(3).
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides a much more limited authorization for revealing
information, permitting disclosure only "to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6(b)(1). This provision was the subject of
great debate and substantial commentary. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:302,
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A. "Required by Law" Exception to Confidentiality Principle
The exception that gives lawyers the discretion to reveal infor-
mation when "required by law" or court order typically meshes
comfortably with the attorney-client privilege. The lawyer is obli-
gated under the ethical confidentiality principle to refuse voluntari-
ly to disclose information arguably covered by the attorney-client
privilege. When, however, a court rules that the privilege is not
available, the attorney is freed from the ethical constraint. Then,
the attorney not only has the right to reveal the information but
indeed may well be obligated to do so."
The reporting statutes do create a clear disclosure requirement
where an attorney obtains information that otherwise would have
been protected by the ethical confidentiality principle. As noted
above, the ethics rules' definition of "confidential information" is
broader than the attorney-client privilege. It includes information
obtained from a third party as well as information obtained from
the client but in the presence of unnecessary third parties,s nei-
ther of which is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The
existence of a legal duty of lawyers to report abuse means that
information defined as confidential under the ethics rules and out-
at 166 (provision engendered a "firestorm of protest").
However, although the provision of the Model Rules was passed by the ABA
House of Delegates in this form, the much broader authorization for disclosure of the
Model Code appears to remain predominant in the states. Sobelson, supra note 82, at
703 n.1, 743 n.211 (Model Rules not received enthusiastically and very few states have
adopted the confidentiality provisions without revision, most rejecting the restriction of
disclosure to serious crimes as proposed in the Model Rules). See infra note 128.
107. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, §§ 1.6:108, 1.6:112 to :113.
Existing law does not definitively establish whether the attorney has an obligation
to seek review of the ruling by interlocutory appeal. See Hodes, supra note 82, at 759 &
n.70 (supporting such a duty). Typically the attorney may refuse to answer and be held
in contempt, with enforcement of the sanction for contempt stayed until appellate review
has been completed. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 92, at 340-41 &
n.13. However, trial courts are not always so accommodating, and some authorities argue
that the lawyer should not follow a course that obstructs the proceedings and should
instead submit to the trial court's ruling unless in the attorney's judgment it is clearly
wrong. Id. § 92, at 341 & n.14. Cf. Baiter v. Regan, 468 N.E.2d 688, 689 (N.Y.) (affirm-
ing criminal contempt conviction against attorney who refused to represent client in vio-
lation of ethical rules regarding conflict of interest, appellate court recognizing lawyer's
good faith but concluding he was not entitled to disobey trial court's order since any
prejudice could have been remedied through the appellate process), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
934 (1984).
108. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:108, at 142.2; MODEL RULES, supra
note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 22.
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side the attorney-client privilege must be reported, whereas the
typically more significant confidential communications covered by
the attorney-client privilege remain unaffected by this excep-
tion."
Whereas the attorney-client privilege, which has the force of
law, may override reporting requirements, the c6mmand that a
lawyer keep information confidential as part of her professional
responsibility cannot supersede an otherwise mandatory legal duty
to report."' Therefore, the lawyer is obligated... to report abuse
if learned from sources outside the attorney-client privilege, even
though, but for the legal duty to disclose created by the reporting
statute, the lawyer would be required to keep knowledge so
learned secret under threat of professional discipline.
Furthermore, the exception to the ethics rules and the privi-
lege conflict when child abuse reporting statutes are involved,
109. As set out in Part I, the reporting statutes, which I contend should reasonably
be interpreted to require reporting by attorneys, should not be interpreted to abrogate
the attorney-client privilege if silent on the issue. The reporting statutes have a different
effect on the ethics confidentiality principle, however. The principal reason is that as con-
trasted to the privilege, the ethics rules need not be overridden. The "required by law"
provision indicates that the ethics rules are to have no effect when disclosure is otherwise
required by law; the ethics rules need not be abrogated insofar as they explicitly defer to
any required disclosure requirement, which the reporting requirements surely constitute. A
secondary distinction flows from the different status of these two sets of rules. As a
matter of analysis of legislative intent, it is hard to argue that legislation that is silent
about the privilege should be assumed to abrogate such a well-known and well-estab-
lished protection against disclosure. Because of the ethics rules' much inferior status as a
basis to resist disclosure, implicit abrogation is a much more reasonable interpretation.
110. WOLFRAM, supra note 71, § 6.7.3, at 301 (noting that except for information cov-
ered by the attorney-client privilege, confidential information is protected only against
voluntary attorney disclosures and not against disclosures required by reporting laws or
discovery rules); see also Lefstein, supra note 58, at 918 (no privilege attaches to "se-
crets" protected by ethics codes and courts are free to override the professional obliga-
tion of confidentiality for policy reasons); Sobelson, supra note 82, at 713 ("[T]he doc-
trine of 'secrets,' is a doctrine of ethics which is not, strictly speaking, binding upon the
courts.") (footnotes omitted); Subin, supra note 74, at 1145 (ethical rules subservient to
other statutory law, so attorney cannot invoke ethical rule of confidentiality to resist
court-ordered disclosure outside attorney-client privilege).
111. "Obligation" is used here in the sense that failure to provide the information
would result in the attorney committing a crime. There would be no obligation as such
under most state's disciplinary rules that merely permit disclosure rather than requiring it.
Professors Hazard and Hodes state the practical result as follows: "The law of lawyering
'itself does not create a mandatory duty to disclose, but if [the lawyer] comes to the
conclusion that he is permitted to volunteer [information] . . . and may go to jail if he
does not, the pressure to reveal will be virtually irresistible in practice." 1 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:114, at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
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chiefly for procedural reasons.1  The "procedural" problem is
that the lawyer can herself violate the reporting law and subject
herself to criminal punishment before the scope of the privilege
can be determined. Most child abuse reporting statutes require a
report to be made within a specified period,' and failure to
make disclosure during that period constitutes a completed crime,
subjecting the lawyer to criminal punishment."4 Thus, unlike the
typical ruling on attorney-client privilege, which occurs in the
courtroom with a judicial officer making a ruling on the issue
coincident with creation of the duty to report, no judicial ruling
precedes the effective operation of law in cases involving suspected
abuse.115
The most readily available mechanism for lawyer guid-
ance-the states' ethics panels-will generally be unable to provide
an effective answer. Ethics panels occupy an uncomfortable posi-
tion. On the one hand, the Commentary to the Model Rules state
that "a presumption should exist against" other law superseding
112. At a substantive level, the ethics rules add nothing to the analysis beyond that
developed supra in Part II. If the privilege has been abrogated by legislative action
through enactment of reporting statutes or if such disclosures cannot be protected be-
cause the attorney-client privilege does not apply to out-of-court disclosures, then the
attorney is permitted under rules of professional ethics to disclose the information. In
either situation, the reporting statute would constitute a superseding legal duty to reveal
abuse that creates an exception to the ethical principle of confidentiality. However, if the
attorney-client privilege remains applicable to client communications regarding child abuse,
then the attorney has no legal duty to report and remains under the ethical imperative
to maintain the confidence.
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504(2)(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) ("shall be
made immediately"); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-4 (Burns 1987) ("shall immediately
make an oral report"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704(b)(1)(i) (1991) ("as soon as
possible"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.220(1) (Michie 1991) ("immediately, but in no
event later than 24 hours after there is reason to believe that a child has been abused
or neglected"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(1) (1989) ("shall immediately notify").
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.513(1) (second degree misdemeanor); IND. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-11-20(a) (class B misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43213.240 (misde-
meanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-511 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (class B misdemeanor).
115. Given the apparently clear command that attorneys report child abuse, the situa-
tion is arguably different from that presented when the lawyer declines to provide the
information in response to judicial order so that the issue may be litigated effectively. Cf.
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975) (lawyer may not be held in contempt for advising
client in good faith to test Fifth Amendment issue by refusing to comply with a court
order that may subject the client to contempt). In the area of child abuse, the desire to
protect the health and welfare of the child may be held to require immediate disclosure
and therefore not permit delay for the purpose of litigating the issue fully before disclo-
sure.
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the confidentiality principle.116 On the other, it recognizes that
interpretation of whether another provision creates a superseding
legal duty is beyond the scope of the disciplinary rules,1 7 and
presumably beyond the authority of an ethics committee, to deter-
mine."' A lawyer may be told, accordingly, that her failure to
report suspected abuse will not subject her to disciplinary action
by the bar-yet such a failure may constitute a criminal act.19
116. MODEL RULEs, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 25.
117. Id.
118. See Sobelson, supra note 82, at 729 (noting that the interpretation of questions of
law is beyond the jurisdiction of ethics committees). In all likelihood, ethics committees
that do interpret questions of law will be ignored. See, e.g., In re Doe, 456 N.Y.S.2d 312,
315-16 (Co. Ct. 1982) (in deciding whether to compel testimony from lawyer regarding
client's whereabouts, court refused to be bound by decision of bar association ethics
opinion regarding the confidentiality principle under rules of professional responsibility);
State v. Jones (In re Banks), 726 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tenn. 1987) (upholding contempt
conviction of attorney even though refusal to comply with trial court's order based on
unambiguous command of ethics opinion; ruling that ethics opinions do not have force of
law and are not binding on the courts, which may disagree with the opinions); see also
Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1412
(1992) (the only instance in which courts are bound to treat ethics rules as binding pre-
cepts are in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers).
119. A recent North Carolina ethics opinion had difficulty in clearly defining the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and as a result concluded that it was not unethical
to report child abuse. N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 120 (July 17, 1992), re-
printed in N.C. ST. B. NEWSL, Spring 1992, at 7 (revised proposed draft; for notification
of approval, see N.C. ST. B. NEWSL., Summer 1992, at 7). The opinion also took the
untenable position, at least from the perspective of the attorney, that not reporting was
also an ethically satisfactory response that would not subject the attorney to professional
discipline but might well result in a criminal conviction. Id.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to see why a lawyer will not report, given
the threat of criminal prosecution if she does not do so. The incentive to report is par-
ticularly strong because disciplinary proceedings are rare for disclosures in violation of
the confidentiality principle. See 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 5472, at
91-92.
The conclusion that lawyers will likely report once the existence of the reporting
duty is made known is, of course, not self-evident. Many professionals are likely to have
a deeply ingrained predisposition against disclosure of confidential information that may
continue even in this context. Indeed, the experience with currency reporting require-
ments under 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. II 1990), see supra note 65, indicates' that lawyers
will sometimes vigorously resist compliance. My argument is that ordinary assumptions
about confidentiality should not be expected to operate where the professional is person-
ally threatened with criminal sanctions for maintaining secrets. This is particularly true
where not only is the conduct involved morally reprehensible, but also there is a reason-
able prospect that the conduct will ultimately be detected and some chance that the
lawyer's knowledge of it will be discovered. Moreover, the typical client in the child
abuse context does not command the type of economic resources that could reasonably
induce the lawyer to chance prosecution on the basis of an economic calculation that the
risk is worth taking.
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The lawyer is thus placed in an extremely vulnerable posi-
tioni' where both professional and personal self-preservation re-
quire disclosure. In recent years, courts and ethics panels have in-
creasingly recognized the right of an attorney who is, or may be-
come, the target of criminal or civil action to make disclosures of
confidential information for self-protection.' The real possibility
of being charged with the crime of failing to disclose child abuse
constitutes at least a comparable threat to the welfare of the law-
yer.'2 Therefore, absent a clear ruling from a state bar ethics
committee that disclosure would constitute an ethics violation,
reporting will almost certainly occur."2
Moreover, disclosure may substantially harm the client's legal
interests without an effective remedy even if it constitutes a viola-
tion of ethics rules or the attorney-client privilege. This is true if,
in accord with the current majority position, such violations do not
entail exclusion of derivative uses of the disclosure. For instance,
120. See, eg., In re Nackson, 555 A.2d 1101, 1107 (N.L 1989) (observing that it
"takes no small measure of courage to stand alone before a grand jury and insist on up-
holding the requirements of the profession in the face of a contempt charge"); Dike v.
Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 492 (Wash. 1968) (describing how the attorney upon refusing to
answer the court's questions about his client's whereabouts on the basis of attorney-client
privilege was handcuffed and jailed).
121. Cunningham, supra note 62, at 1042-43 (noting the expanding use of the excep-
tion to attorney-client privilege under a concept of attorney self-defense in recent years
and observing that this exception gives incentive to prosecutors and plaintiffs to initiate
action against a lawyer in order to obtain client confidences); see also 1 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 62, §§ 1.6:112, 1.6:306, 1.6:310 (observing that "required by law" pro-
vision or threat of criminal proceedings may create a situation where the lawyer discloses
information as a method of self-defense).
The existence of a criminal penalty against the attorney for failure to reveal the
information provides the same type of inducement to breach the privilege as a threatened
civil or criminal action against the lawyer in the absence of such a reporting statute.
122. See Sobelson, supra note 82, at 758-61 (discussing recent attorney self-defense
cases); Cunningham, supra note 62, at 1010-26 (same).
123. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:114, at 153-54 (characterizing
pressures to reveal information as "virtually irresistible in practice" when lawyer threat-
ened with jail for nondisclosure). Cf. Lefstein, supra note 58, at 925 (recognizing that in
light of laws criminalizing tampering with physical evidence that may be applied to attor-
neys who receive physical evidence from their clients, attorneys may believe that they
must always disclose such evidence to authorities to avoid criminal prosecution). See also
supra note 119.
Given the lack of authority of ethics panels to bind courts, see supra note 118,
even a clear ruling may not be sufficient to guarantee that disclosures will not be made.
Indeed, reliance on ethics opinions does not necessarily protect the lawyer even against
professional discipline, although it will typically induce the disciplinary authority as a
matter of discretion not to prosecute or to mitigate substantially any sanction imposed.
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whereas the lawyer may be barred from testifying as to the com-
munication because it was protected by either ethics rules"u or
the attorney-client privilege, the lawyer's identification of the de-
fendant and the victim and information obtained through investiga-
tion of leads may not be suppressible." Thus, although the draft-
ers of the mandatory child abuse reporting statutes may not have
intended to reshape the attorney-client privilege, the mere exis-
tence of these statutes, which raise questions regarding the contin-
ued protection of the privilege, has an important impact upon how
the ethics rules that might otherwise preclude disclosure are ap-
plied.
B. Reporting Abuse Based on the Possibility or Probability that a
Client Will Commit a Future Crime
Both the attorney-client privilege and ethics rules permit some
disclosure when a client contemplates commission of a future
crime or fraud. Although responding to basically similar concerns,
these exceptions differ somewhat in scope. An examination of the
124. Whether violation of an ethics rule is ever grounds for suppression of evidence
offered by the prosecution is unclear. See Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla.
1985) (suppression of statements taken from client represented by attorney in violation of
disciplinary rule not justified because disciplinary action against attorney who violated
rule provides satisfactory remedy), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986); People v. Green,
274 N.W.2d 448, 454-55 (Mich. 1979) (violation of disciplinary rule regarding contact with
individual represented by counsel only through that party's counsel should be handled by
disciplinary action rather than suppression); Pannell v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (because disciplinary rule does not constitute law of state, violation of
rule will not bar introduction of evidence). But see United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d
834, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (suppression may be an available remedy for violation of
ethics rule prohibiting contact by lawyer with a party represented by counsel without the
consent of that party's counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 192 (1990); United States v.
Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
125. One commentator suggests there may be a basis for suppression in that the state,
through the command of its statute, is directly involved in causing the initial disclosure.
Subin, supra note 74, at 1104 n.79, 1126-27 (although it is unclear that exclusionary rule
should apply to a voluntary breach of privilege by an attorney because of lack of state
involvement, its application is easier when disclosure is produced by mandatory duty).
But cf supra note 88 (authorities discussing general inapplicability of doctrine suppressing
derivative uses of violation of evidentiary privilege). However, even if some "fruits" of
the illegality are suppressed, the scope of the "fruits" doctrine is unlikely to be broad or
powerful enough to exclude results of investigative leads, exclusion of which would have
the practical effect of immunizing the criminality. Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463, 475 (1980) (preexisting ability of victim to identify the defendant cannot be sup-
pressed as the fruit of defendant's illegal arrest).
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differences helps explicate the doctrines and sets the stage for later
observations.
The attorney-client privilege has long recognized a "crime-
fraud" exception. Although its precise dimensions are in some
dispute,1" the core of the "crime-fraud" exception is that "the
privilege does not extend to communications between attorney and
client where the client's purpose is the furtherance of a future
intended crime or fraud.""iH The exception to the ethical confi-
dentiality principle is in many jurisdictions much broader, permit-
ting7 or requiring' disclosure of "[t]he intention of his client
126. For a history of the somewhat circuitous early development of the crime-fraud
exception, see Fried, supra note 64, at 446-61, and Hazard, supra note 72, at 1061-91.
Two early cases establish some of the core elements of the exception. The first is
Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1139 (1743). The decision in
Annesley rested on the unexceptional proposition that discussion regarding an illegal pur-
pose fell outside the privilege because in the context of the case it was not a communi-
cation directed at obtaining legal advice for which the lawyer had been secured. The
client's statements were made to the lawyer not in the capacity of a lawyer but as a
friend. Id. at 1239-40. Thus, the case, while in fact concerning a contemplated crime, did
not necessarily rest on that fact but a more general limitation on the privilege still fol-
lowed today.
The second case, The Queen v. Cox & Railton, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884), much more
clearly established the proposition that consultation for the purpose of perpetrating a
crime is outside the privilege. The court stated:
In order that the rule [attorney-client privilege] may apply there must be both
professional confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a
criminal object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these
elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his
solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not
consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to
further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his object he reposes no
confidence, for the state of facts, which is the foundation of the supposed confi-
dence, does not exist. The solicitor's advice is obtained by a fraud.
Id. at 168.
127. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 95, at 350.
128. See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1) (1992); MASS. CAN-
ONS OF ETHICS & DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW DR
4-101(C)(3) (1992); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4(C) (1992). These states
continue to adhere to the formulation of the Model Code as opposed to the much more
narrow exception in the Model Rules, the latter permitting disclosure only of extremely
serious future crimes. See supra note 106.
129. Florida requires disclosure of information believed necessary to prevent a client
from committing any crime. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(b)(1) (1992) ("A law-
yer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes necessary: . . . [t]o
prevent a client from committing a crime. ... ) (emphasis added). Nevada, New Jersey,
and Wisconsin also require disclosure of confidential information limited to more serious
crimes, making disclosure mandatory when the lawyer "reasonably believes" disclosure is
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime involving death or serious bodily
injury. NEV. SuP. CT. R. 156(2) (1992); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime.""
The two exceptions differ in one key respect. For a communi-
cation to fall within the "crime-fraud exception" to the attorney-
client privilege, the client must consult the attorney with a purpose
of furthering a future crime or fraud. The intention of the client to
misuse the lawyer's services is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition to void the privilege."' However, if the lawyer also
supports the evil purpose, an additional justification for disclosure
arises. The policies of the privilege do not support protection for
lawyer-client communications when the lawyer is participating in a
criminal conspiracy or lending aid to the commission of a
wrong."
In contrast, the exception to the ethics rule applies when the
lawyer learns of the client's intention to commit a future crime or
fraud, regardless of whether the client sought to use the lawyer's
aid in the venture. 3 No improper use of the lawyer's services is
1.6(b)(1) (1992); Wis. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.6(b) (1991).
130. MASS. CANONS OF ETHICS & DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE
OF LAW DR 4-101(C)(3) (1992).
Obviously some child abuse may threaten serious bodily harm and even death.
Indeed, the limitation to serious future crimes probably has little necessary impact in the
child abuse area with respect to substantial instances of abuse. Courts or ethics panels
can, without distorting the words beyond their reasonable meaning, define the impact of
abuse, whether involving physical trauma or sexual exploitation with its accompanying
psychological damage, as constituting serious injury to these particularly vulnerable vic-
tims. See RUTH F. THURMAN, CLIENT INCEST AND THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF CONFIDEN-
TIALITY 17 (1985) (setting out argument for incest as substantial injury); Indianapolis Bar
Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (Apr. 29, 1986) (noting that child abuse: (1)
typically is repetitive and that repeated abuse raises the likelihood of serious injury or
death; (2) may be gravely damaging to emotional health; and (3) can lead to other seri-
ous physical conditions and psychological disorders).
131. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1511 (1985) (test generally derived from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Clark v. Unit-
ed States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); see also Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 ("The privilege takes
flight if the relation [between attorney and client] is abused. A client who consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help
from the law.").
132. The lawyer here is not acting as part of the adversary system, as she is when
defending past crime, and can receive no justification from that system. The lawyer is
simply a criminal, and the law denies the privilege in part to add to the risk that the
lawyer must take into account in joining the illegal venture. WOLFRAM, supra note 71, §
6.4.10, at 279.
133. This exception to the confidentiality rule incorporates two important 1rinciples of
American law regarding confidentiality. First, it exempts from protection statements in
furtherance of a crime, and second it draws a distinction between past and future crime.
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required, and certainly no participation by the lawyer in the im-
propriety is necessary. Instead, confidentiality is denied to prevent
crimes or other wrongs known to the lawyer before their commis-
sion."M In one respect, the broader exception under the ethical
confidentiality principle makes absolute sense: Because the ethical
principle is much broader than the privilege, protecting informa-
tion obtained from both the client and various other sources, its
protections for at least some information should be swept away
when it conflicts with the important social goal of avoiding a fu-
ture wrong.
Application of the "future crimes" exception to the ethical
confidentiality principle to the reporting of abuse is both compli-
cated and interesting. An example may help to illustrate the intri-
cacy of its application to child abuse.
A lawyer learns in the course of discussion with a male
client, who is involved in a divorce action, that the client has had
disagreements with his wife, which are in part related to the
client's treatment of the couple's children. Under local law the
facts related to that dispute may affect the amount of support
payments and the custody of the children. The client states that
his wife believes he physically. (or sexually) abused one of the
young children, who cannot because of her tender years recount
accurately what transpired. The client acknowledges the abuse
but assures the lawyer that it occurred only once (or rarely) and
then under extenuating circumstances. Furthermore, he adamantly
insists that he will never repeat this conduct.135
Sobelson, supra note 82, at 738.
134. As the Ethics Committee of the New York State Bar put it, "[t]he future crime
exception recognizes both the possible preventability of the crime, as well as the total
absence of any societal need to encourage criminal clients to make such disclosures to
their lawyers." N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978), re-
printed in N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1978, at 24.
135. This example can be made somewhat stronger by adding further admitted in-
stances of abuse. However, rarely, if ever, is a client likely to admit directly to the attor-
ney that abuse will occur again, so that uncertainty of intent will be a constant factor in
these cases. Indeed, in most cases, the client is more likely to deny ever committing the
abuse in the first instance, and it is likely to be the lawyer's investigation, rather than
the client's own statement, that leads to the belief that abuse occurred. No attorney-client
privilege exists in such situations as to third-party information, however. Whether such
"confidential information" was subject to disclosure might be a difficult question under
the exception to the ethical confidentiality principle for future crime, but the issue is
easily resolved under the requirements of a child abuse reporting statute. The reporting
statute clearly constitutes a superseding legal duty that overrides ethics rules, and the
lawyer must report. See supra Section III(A).
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It is important to observe that the client makes no admission
that he intends to commit a future crime. Instead, the "future
crimes" exception can be applied only by inferring from past crim-
inality that future wrongdoing will occur. Moreover, providing
information necessary to prevent future crime will often, if not
always, require revelation of past events. However, when revela-
tions relate to past crime, the protection of the privilege is the
clearest, and the exception to the ethics rule is inapplicable. In-
deed, some commentators argue that, because revelation of past
crime cannot be tolerated under ethics rules, the obligation to
reveal inseparable future crime is eliminated." However, al-
though the prospect of revealing past crime should make the anal-
ysis a much more sensitive one, it does not trump all other con-
cerns.
This issue remains in doubt because the authorities do not
uniformly prohibit reporting past crime as a byproduct of disclos-
ing future criminality," and ethics rules explicitly create no abso-
lute prohibition in this context. Moreover, the reality outside the
field of professional ethics is that, because of the nature of some
types of child abuse, a prediction of future criminality can in fact
be based on information regarding past conduct."
136. See Abraham Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 FoRDHAM
URBAN L.J. 11, 17-18 (1985) (making argument with respect to possession of proceeds of
crime that the prevalent and better view is that an attorney may not reveal continuing
crime because it necessitates disclosure of past crine, which is prohibited by ethics rules);
Callan & David, supra note 64, at 362-65 (acknowledging that issue is not free from
doubt but arguing that "appropriate and prevailing" view is that attorney need not and
should not reveal continuing aspects of past criminal conduct); Sobelson, supra note 82,
at 751-52 (arguing that reporting not proper when revealing future conduct may disclose
confidences relating to past conduct); see also In re Nackson, 555 A.2d 1101, 1105 (N.J.
1989) (citing Callan & David argument with approval on question of knowledge of
client's whereabouts).
.137. See, e.g., Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-60 (Apr. 28, 1983) (au-
thorizing lawyer to reveal information regarding client who was abusing child and whom
lawyer believed would continue to do so in the future); see also Stuart, supra note 78, at
253 (arguing for an interpretation of ethics rules that permits reporting the continuing
and future crime of child abuse).
The authorities prohibiting revelation typically involve a true continuing crime, such
as possession of proceeds of crime or contraband, where no new criminal conduct will be
committed in the future. The predominant consequence of reporting the crime is the
revelation of past conduct, not the prevention of a future, additional wrong. Child abuse,
in contrast, if it will indeed occur in the future, constitutes a very serious additional
social harm that renders the strongest precedent opposing disclosure arguably inapposite.
138. THURMAN, supra note 130, at 23 (accepting modern medical and social scientific
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Initially, it is critical to note that child abuse is not a continu-
ing offense, although sometimes loosely and incorrectly described
as such. "9 Instead, child abuse is a repetitive crime. The similari-
ty to a continuing offense arises from the substantial likelihood of
repetition that arguably may warrant disclosure under the "future
crimes" exception to the confidentiality principle. The fact that
abuse does not constitute a true continuing offense makes the
inquiry under the "future crimes" exception much more difficult.
When an offense is continuing, the lawyer can have no certainty
that she has sufficient knowledge that the client will commit a
crime because of the difficulty inherent in predicting future human
conduct. In contrast, where an offense is repetitive, the prediction
of future criminality is itself both critical and problematic.1'"
The degree of knowledge necessary to justify disclosure of
future criminality has been a very troublesome issue for the draft-
ers of ethics rules,"" and not surprisingly, different knowledge
data that child abuse often occurs in a recurring pattern as part of argument for permis-
sive disclosure of sexual abuse by parent who has persisted in abuse over a period of
time); see also Besharov, supra note 22, at 478 (arguing broadly that child abuse and
neglect would fall under future criminal activity exception as "a course of conduct");
infra note 156 (discussing battered child syndrome).
139. Se4 eg., Stuart, supra note 78, at 253 (stating that child abuse is both a con-
tinuing and a future crime).
140. Another important impact of the distinction between a completed and a continu-
ing offense is that there is no duty to report a fully completed crime. See In re Nackson,
555 A.2d 1101, 1105-06 (N.J. 1989).
141. Under the Model Code, a lawyer is permitted to disclose information about the
client's intention to commit any crime and the information necessary to prevent it. MOD-
EL CODE, supra note 17, DR 4-101(C)(3). The wording of the standard, which on the
one hand focuses on the client's intention to commit crime but also refers to the steps
necessary to prevent it, makes it unclear what the lawyer needs to "know" with regard
to the likelihood that the crime will take place beyond the client's intention to commit it.
A footnote added to the Code by way of commentary unfortunately increases the confu-
sion, suggesting that a lawyer is required to disclose if she has knowledge beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the crime will be committed. Id. DR 4-101 n.16. It has been suggest-
ed, however, that if the standard of knowledge is beyond a reasonable doubt, then law-
yers will be encouraged to evade it under a claim that a lawyer can never have such
knowledge, as that determination is only for a jury or judge. MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-58 (1975); 1 HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 62, § 1.6:302, at 165 n.1.
The Model Rules in their final form, while narrowing the range of crimes to which
reporting was even permitted to only the most serious, employ a "reasonable belief'
standard, which is defined to mean "that the lawyer believes the matter in question and
that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." MODEL RULES, supra note
17, at 10. Although the drafting is not entirely clear on this issue, it appears that the
"reasonable belief' standard applies to the likelihood that the illegal conduct will take
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standards have been required by the courts and bar associations.
Some authorities have demanded a relatively rigorous knowledge
standard to prevent erosion of the protections afforded to confi-
dential communications. 2 Others have been somewhat less de-
manding; one recent ethics opinion requires that the lawyer must
conclude only that the future crime was "reasonably likely."43
Regardless of the standard of knowledge used,1" all types of
place. See Hodes, supra note 82, at 807 (noting lax draftsmanship on the Final Draft,
which did not change on this point before final adoption, resulting in language that "says
nothing" about knowledge or belief that the conduct will take place).
The Commentary, however, appears to speak clearly on the point as follows:
The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or serious
bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a client. It is
very difficult for a lawyer to "know" when such a heinous purpose will actually
be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 23.
142. Se4 eg., United States v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 733 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D. Fla.
1990) ("The actual knowledge standard is necessary to prevent unnecessary disclosure of
client confidences and to protect the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship.").
143. Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990)
(giving lawyer discretion to reveal facts regarding client's past conviction related to child
abuse, considered confidential information, if lawyer concludes it is reasonably likely that
client, who has taken a new job caring for disturbed young children, would commit a
crime against children in his care).
In its rule, Wisconsin requires revealing "such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal . .. act,"
but limits this reporting to very serious crimes "that the lawyer reasonably believes
[are] . . . likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm" (and to similarly serious
frauds). WIs. SuP. Cr. R. 20:1.6(b). This is a modified, mandatory version of the Model
Rules formulation and relies on the same definition of the term "reasonably believes"
contained in the Rules, i.e., "the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, at
10. Reasonable belief as to the likelihood of the client actually committing the crime
rather than anything approaching actual knowledge is the operable standard.
This standard was applied by the Wisconsin Bar Committee on Professional Ethics
to child abuse. The ethics committee concluded that if the lawyer "reasonably believes"
that the abuse will continue, the lawyer is obligated to report information regarding a
client to prevent the commission of a crime involving likely substantial bodily or emo-
tional harm. Wis. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. E-88-11 (Dec. 7,
1988).
144. If child abuse reporting laws are held to constitute a superseding legal duty un-
der the "required by law" exception to the ethical principle, questions about the quantum
of proof under the "future crimes" exception become largely moot. Under the reporting
laws a much lower standard of proof would produce direct disclosure of the past conduct
upon which the fear of future criminality was based. Mandatory reporting duties are trig-
gered when an individual has "cause to suspect," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1989),
"reasonable suspicion," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-15(A) (Michie 1989), or "reasonable
cause to believe," NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:10 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992), that abuse has
occurred. See generally Besharov, supra note 22, at 471 (discussing the import of such
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child abuse should not be treated identically under the "future
crimes" exception.14 Some conduct constituting abuse under often
exceptionally broad statutory definitions, which may include any
non-accidental injury,"~' involves no special likelihood of repeti-
tion. Other conduct, in contrast, reflects either a special psycholog-
ical propensity for the violent treatment of children or perhaps an
even more powerful drive to commit sexual abuse. 7 In these lat-
ter situations, the level of probability may be sufficiently high to
constitute a degree of knowledge of future criminal conduct au-
thorizing disclosure regardless of the standard, used. However,
expert advice from the psychiatric/psychological community will
often be necessary for a proper decision." Moreover, such deter-
language, which he describes as ranging between unfounded suspicion and probable cause
to believe, but contends is fundamentally equivalent and represents a quantum of proof
something less than "probable cause").,
145. Note, however, that if the exception to the ethical confidentiality principle comes
from the theory that the reporting statutes create a superseding legal duty, then this
inquiry is unnecessary. Past criminality is not being used to predict future crime; the fact
of past criminality must itself be reported and that duty stands as an exception to the
confidentiality principle.
146. Se4 e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04 (West Supp. 1992) (misdemeanor child abuse
committed, inter alia, by knowingly or with culpable negligence inflicting physical or men-
tal injury to child; felony child abuse requires great bodily harm, permanent disability, or
permanent disfigurement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2, 318A(a) (1986) (misdemeanor
child abuse committed, inter alia, by infliction of physical injury by other than accidental
means on child less than 16 years of age; felony child abuse requiring intentional inflic-
tion of serious injury); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1992) (of-
fense, inter alia, for intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence caus-
ing injury to child under 14 years of age, with severity of the penalty dependent upon
abuser's mental state); see also DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, COMBATING CHILD ABUSE:
GUIDELINES FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICES 16-17 (1990) (dichotomy between criminal and noncriminal child abuse not a
useful distinction in most states as definition of criminal child abuse very broad).
147. The Massachusetts ethics committee explicitly recognized the possible "compul-
sion" to commit crime in these circumstances. See Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profession-
al Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990) (suggesting lawyer may believe that client "rea-
sonably likely to be driven by compulsion to commit a crime similar to his past [criminal
assaults on children]"). Cf. Indianapolis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (Apr.
29, 1986) (noting that child abuser may frequently repeat offense as long as conditions
and opportunities remain unchanged). For a discussion of the likelihood of repetition in
child abuse cases, see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
148. Indianapolis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (Apr. 29, 1986) (advising
consultation with social worker, psychologist, or other professional with training and expe-
rience in the area to assist in determining client's intent to commit future crime). The
lawyer, however, must be careful in seeking this advice because almost any other expert
will have no discretion regarding reporting if that expert gains sufficient information for
"reasonable suspicion" to believe that abuse has occurred. See Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No.
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minations cannot be reached categorically. They must instead be
reached through careful examination of the circumstances of each
case,149 and even then, unfortunately, results will often be un-
clear.1 '
With regard to child abuse, the determination that the client
will commit a future crime is difficult not only because it is based
entirely on past conduct without a statement of intent, but also
because the disclosure required to prevent the future crime will
frequently be unusual. Because the lawyer does not know of any
specific planned criminal episode, the action required to prevent
the crime will be quite general and potentially expansive in
scope."' In some cases, referral to the relevant social services
90-007 (Feb. 8, 1990) (clear duty of psychotherapist to report abuse requires reporting
even when client consulted at request of lawyer except when consultation protected by
Sixth Amendment after that right attaches when formal criminal charges have been filed).
For a discussion of the implications of this statutory pattern for the lawyer's role in
preventing crime by promoting treatment, see infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
149. See Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15,
1990) (determination whether future crime reasonably likely generally requires consider-
ation of number of factors that are difficult to evaluate).
150. It is important to note that in this situation the lawyer is not operating under a
threat of criminal prosecution for failure to report. Where criminal prosecution is threat-
ened, I have argued that the incentives to report even marginal evidence of abuse are
extremely strong. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Which way uncertainty as
to the lawyer's authority to reveal information will push the decision here regarding
disclosure is less clear.
Several state ethics panels have taken the position that, because of the difficulty in
predicting future crime, a lawyer making any reasonable judgment should be free from
disciplinary action. Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June
15, 1990); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 562, 1984 N.Y. ST.
BJ. 54, 54-55; Wis. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. E-89-9 (May 24,
1989).1
Civil sanctions for action or inaction present an additional concern. See Mass. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990) (noting that separate
from the disciplinary issue, lawyers might be subject to civil suit either for failing to
warn potential victims if they did not disclose or for malpractice based on wrongful reve-
lation of confidential information if they did disclose).
In the ordinary situation, how the lawyer's conflicting incentive would affect the
decision to reveal or remain silent might be indeterminate. Lawyers might generally be
assumed not to want to disclose the information out of a desire to please their clients.
Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice,
Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 139
(1988). This general conclusion may not, however, be accurate when the lawyer is ap-
pointed by the court to represent an indigent client and as a result the client is not
paying the lawyer's fee and continued appointments will depend upon the judge's view of
the lawyer's integrity.
151. This contrasts with other situations, in which the protective action may be care-
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING LAWS
agency for either treatment or punishment will be sufficient. In
others, prevention may require permanent removal of the client
from the presence of a particular child or all children, which may
mean in turn that the client must be incarcerated. In either situa-
tion, the lawyer must reveal what she knows about the past con-
duct in order to prevent future criminality; and revelations that are
so explicitly backward-looking are unusual, if not unprecedented,
as satisfying the ethical duty to thwart a future wrong.' How-
ever, despite these difficulties, ethics panels in a number of juris-
dictions have rather freely offered the "future crimes" exception as
authorization for disclosure of a client's act of child abuse.
Once established, this precedent has substantial promise for
application and misuse in other areas. For example, a legal aid
attorney may learn that her client, who is facing eviction from his
housing project for the burglary of a neighboring apartment, is
addicted to drugs, is unemployed, and has committed similar bur-
glaries to support his drug habit. Not only is the likelihood of that
client's committing future crimes of the same type extremely high,
but the conduct necessary to prevent such future crimes is as diffi-
fully targeted. For example, when confronted with a specific threat by a client to go into
court in a half hour and kill the judge and two participants in the litigation, the opinion
of the ethics committee rendered on an emergency basis was that the lawyer should alert
security personnel to the danger of the attack without the need to disclose even the
identity of the client. Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibili-
ty, Inq. No. 90-28 (Feb. 23, 1990).
Sometimes in child abuse cases, a carefully tailored remedy will also be possible.
For instance, an individual may be removed from employment giving him access to po-
tential victims, particularly especially vulnerable ones. Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990) (individual previously convicted of assault on
children discovered by' his lawyer from earlier case in new employment caring for dis-
turbed young children). However, the remedy will more typically require expansive ac-
tion.
152. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
153. In various contexts, reporting of future abuse based on past conduct has been
authorized by the following ethics opinions: Indianapolis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm.,
Op. 1-1986 (Apr. 29, 1986); Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-60 (Apr. 28,
1983); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990);
NJ. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 280 (Supp.) (1974), reprinted in 97
NJ.LJ. 753, 753, 766 (1974); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 120 (July 17, 1992)
reprinted in N.C. ST. B. NEWsL, Spring 1992, at 7 (proposed revised draft; for notifica-
tion of approval, see N.C. ST. B. NEWSL, Summer 1992, at 7); Wis. State Bar Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. E-88-11 (Dec. 7, 1988).
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cult to target precisely in this area as it is in the area of child abuse.
If the "future crimes" exception to the ethical confidentiality
principle now under development in the child abuse field is to be
effectively contained, courts and ethics panels should emphasize
the helplessness of children as the justification for disclosure.'"
However, as a society, we may not want the exception to be so
constrained. Other crimes, such as sexual assaults of adult females,
may be driven by psychological forces as powerful as those that
motivate some types of child abuse.
In specific, the likelihood of repetition varies between types of
child abuse. Empirical research reveals that sexual abusers of
young males, pedophiles, are far more likely to repeat their offens-
es than are sexual abusers of young females.1" However, the like-
lihood of recidivism by pedophiles may still be lower than it is for
offenders who commit aggressive sex crimes against adult fe-
males.'" In any case, some categories of offenses against adults,
specifically violent sexual offenses and offenses driven by various
addictions, will have higher likelihoods of repetition than some
154. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 280 (Supp.) (1974), reprint-
ed in 97 NJ.L.J. 753, 753, 766 (1974) (treating child abuse as sui generis because of
state's concerns for protection and custody of child and holding attorney-client privilege
inapplicable, although opinion may rest on narrower ground that the facts known to the
attorney "demonstrate[d] a propensity of that parent" to abuse the child and thus
brought the case within the continuing crime or future crimes category); THURMAN, supra
note 130, at 16-17 (basing the argument for mandatory disclosure of child sexual abuse
under disciplinary rules on the helpless nature of children at the hands of abusive par-
ents and the overriding societal concern for the welfare and protection of children that
must take precedence over confidentiality rules). Similar arguments are frequently accept-
ed in cases involving child custody where lawyers are required to provide information on
the whereabouts of their client. See, eg., Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368, 1371-72
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1989); Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 498 (Wash. 1968).
155. David Finkelhor, Abusers: Special Topics, in A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE 89, 134 (David Finkelhor ed., 1986).
156. Indeed, evidence from two studies bears out this observation. See Lita Furby et
al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 3, 13, 16, 27 (1989).
These studies cannot be taken to compare the two situations fairly, however. If the
opportunity for sexual abuse continues unchanged, the number of repeated offenses in-
volving the same children, because of their helplessness, should greatly exceed that for
violent acts against different adults, who are likely to offer some resistance and as to
whom each separate incident increases the chances of detection. Also, other types of
child abuse, such as the "battered child syndrome," have as one of their distinguishing
characteristics that they are not comprised of "isolated, atypical event[s] but [are] part of
an environmental mosaic of repeated beatings and abuse that will not only continue but
will become more severe unless there is appropriate medicolegal intervention." Landeros
v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395 (Cal. 1976) (citing C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child
Syndrome, 181 A.M.AJ. 17, 24 (1962)).
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forms of child abuse." Moreover, some of the offenses against
adult victims will be indistinguishable from the most repetitive
types of child abuse in that they too are motivated by quasi-invol-
untary psychological imperatives.
Thus, differentiating the predictability of repetition of child
abuse from other crimes is not a simple proposition. This difficulty
is not significant, however, if reshaping the ethics principles to aid
in preventing and/or detecting some of these other highly repeti-
tive crimes is the socially desired outcome. However, if the goal is
not a general expansion of the "future crimes" exception, care
must be exercised to limit its growth, even with respect to the
appealing cause of preventing child abuse. '58
C. The Interaction Between the "Future Crimes" Exception to the
Ethical Principle of Confidentiality and the "Crime-Fraud"
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
Because the "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-client
privilege requires an effort by the client to involve the attorney in
the future crime, it is narrower than the "future crimes" exception
to the confidentiality principle.159 As a result, some disclosures
otherwise authorized under the latter will presumably remain privi-
leged because they also fall within the attorney-client privilege."w
157. This observation is particularly true given the extremely broad statutory definition
of child abuse used in many states. See supra note 146.
158. Any impact on the confidentiality principle here will stem from the loosening of
ethical constraints rather than from statutory reporting requirements. Thus, issues raised
by child abuse may have an eroding impact on the confidentiality of lawyer-client com-
munications under both the "required by law" and the "future crimes" exceptions to the
ethics rules.
159. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
160. Although these facts are voluntarily revealed by the attorney, disclosure would
not constitute an act authorized explicitly or implicitly by the client so as to waive the
privilege under general principles. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 93, at
341 (privilege belongs to client and only client or attorney acting with client's authority
can waive it); WOLFRAM, supra note 71, § 6.4.4, at 271 (whether the lawyer can waive
the privilege by disclosure is a question of implied authority).
Testimony would be excluded only under the attorney-client privilege, as disclosure
in this circumstance by an attorney would likely not offend the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175-76 (1986) (threat
to reveal client perjury did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because such
disclosure would have comported with ethics codes and constituted reasonable lawyer
conduct); Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact of Nix v. Whiteside on Attorney-Client
Relations, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1988).
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Although the privilege would then prevent the lawyer from testify-
ing,161 disclosure may still carry important consequences as evi-
dence developed through use of the disclosure will likely be admis-
sible."
The practical importance of the conceptual differences be-
tween these two exceptions is reduced, however, because courts
construe the theoretically narrower "crime-fraud" exception broad-
ly." The expansive capacity of the "crime-fraud" exception is
itself notable. Courts seem predisposed to conclude that lawyers
who have received information regarding a future crime have
aided the criminal enterprise. For example, a number of courts
have found a duty to report the whereabouts of a fugitive client
under a theory that the lawyer's conduct in other aspects of the
161. Indianapolis Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (Apr. 29, 1986) (disci-
plinary rule that allows lawyer to reveal confidences implicating past crimes in order to
prevent future crimes does not also permit introduction of testimony regarding those past
crimes); Subin, supra note 74, at 1159 (rules of professional conduct cannot contract the
protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege); see also State v. Green, 493 So. 2d
1178, 1180-85 (La. 1986) (although weapon properly delivered to authorities under ethics
rule was a physical object not protected by attorney-client privilege, authenticating infor-
mation regarding client's possession of it was protected under attorney-client privilege).
162. Ethics panels examining such issues generally have not expressed an opinion
whether the statement itself could be admitted into evidence, see authorities cited in note
153 supra, and judicial opinions do not appear to have examined the issue at all. The
likely reason for silence on the point is that the only question presented to the ethics
panels has been whether out-of-court disclosure is proper, in-court testimony was not
contemplated. Nothing in the ethics opinions gives reason to assume that courts would
rule the privilege, which conceptually should remain valid, automatically to have been lost
because a future crime was contemplated.
While less common, a statement may fall outside the attorney-client privilege but
within the confidentiality principle of ethics rules. Assuming that admission of an
attorney's out-of-court statement does not violate the hearsay rule (as, for example, an
admission of the lawyer as an agent, see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C), (D)), the
issue is not simply whether, as discussed earlier, derivative use of improperly obtained
statements may be excluded. The question here is whether a court is authorized to sup-
press the attorney's statement itself containing the client's confidences as a remedy for
violation of a rule of professional ethics. Ethics rules mandate only discipline of the
attorney for their violation; suppression is a problematic remedy. See supra note 124.
163. The differences between the two exceptions are also narrowed for another rea-
son. Many statements of future criminality that do not fit the "crime-fraud" exception are
denied the protections of the attorney-client privilege on an alternative basis. Although
the client may not have sought to enlist the attorney in the improper conduct, the state-
ments themselves describing the future crime may fall outside the privilege as gratuitous
communications unrelated to obtaining legal advice. This proposition is as ancient as it is
uncontroversial. See Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 1139
(1743), discussed supra note 126.
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case meant that she was aiding the fugitive to commit a crime by
withholding the information."
The expansive capacity of the "crime-fraud" exception can be
illustrated by another look at the hypothetical divorce action de-
scribed earlier in this Part. Once the lawyer learns of the past
abuse, virtually any effort by the attorney to maintain the client's
access to his children can be viewed as involvement in the poten-
tial future abuse, for that access facilitates commission of the
crime." Thus, ethics rules and the attorney-client privilege could
both be construed to allow disclosure once the client's prior con-
duct is deemed sufficient to establish an intention to commit fu-
ture abuse.
164. See, e.g., In re Doe, 456 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Co. Ct. 1982) (lawyer seeking to withhold
client's whereabouts while arguing that indictment should be dismissed for denial of
speedy trial). That the lawyer aided the client in the illegality is more doubtful, but at
least arguable, in some of the other cases requiring disclosure of the client's whereabouts.
See, e.g., Fellerman v. Bradley, 493 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1985) (attorney who helped negotiate
judgment obligating client to pay certain costs could not then maintain the secrecy of his
client's location when the client ceased payments). The courts' conclusions in other cases
that the lawyer aided the client's wrongdoing reflect nothing more than the labelling of
passive action as affirmative assistance. See Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327
(Pa. 1986) (lawyer, would become aider and abettor if he attempted to represent client
while latter a fugitive and so must reveal information about client's whereabouts).
Some courts have created a similarly broad duty for voluntary disclosure of physical
evidence delivered by a client to her attorney. See Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alas-
ka 1978). As with disclosing the whereabouts of a client, the duty to reveal the informa-
tion is developed out of an expansive reading of the commands of the criminal law, such
as a general prohibition against the concealment of evidence. Id. (it is not ineffective
assistance of counsel to disclose evidence to prosecutorial authorities because taking pos-
session of evidence from third party and keeping evidence would appear to constitute
violation of criminal law). See generally Lefstein, supra note 58, at 918-21 (discussing
implications of Morrell and similar cases); Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers, and the Fifth
Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 584-613 (1991)
(same).
165. A similar problem can arise when a lawyer, who is innocent of any initial wrong-
doing, learns that a transaction on which she has done substantial work involves a fraud
against the other party. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death
and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L. REV. 271, 277-79 (1984) (discussing
generally the problems with Model Rules' direction that lawyer learning of client's fraud
should withdraw). Continued participation in the transaction would constitute assisting its
accomplishment, giving rise to potential civil and criminal liability and professional disci-
pline. Id.
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IV. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE AREA OF CHILD ABUSE
A critical question, indeed probably the central question with
regard to the scope of the attorney-client privilege in this area,
concerns the justification for treating confidential communications
with an attorney differently from communications with other pro-
fessionals. Child abuse reporting laws have explicitly abrogated
evidentiary privileges for most other professionals, and judicial
decisions have firmly established that such abrogation effectively
eliminates those professional privileges. Why should legislatures
not treat the attorney-client privilege similarly?
Broadly speaking, two justifications are advanced for affording
privileged status to attorney-client communications. The first and
most widely argued is a utilitarian justification, which is the tradi-
tional justification for this and other privileges. The second is a
non-utilitarian rationale, the major version of which is a rights-
based argument, that in recent years has been gaining support
among proponents of the attorney-client privilege as a more effec-
tivei' or more easily argued167 justification for the privilege.
166. However, the extreme claims of rights-based arguments are themselves subject to
effective attack. Pizzimenti, supra note 82, at 448. For some commentators, the utilitarian
argument remains potentially the stronger of the two justifications. See Bruce M. Lands-
man, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Privilege, in THE GOOD LAWYER 191, 202
(David Luban ed., 1983) (obligation to keep information confidential is stronger the more
the systemic or utilitarian case can be made). Nevertheless, one explanation for the as-
cendance of the rights-based defense of the privilege is the perceived weakness of the
utilitarian justification, particularly its empirical basis. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
64, at 78-79 (noting that some writers favor non-utilitarian arguments because of belief
that empirical basis for utilitarian rationale has not and cannot be proved). The utilitarian
justification, unlike its rights-based counterpart, is vulnerable to such an attack because its
propositions should be empirically verifiable.
For example, Professor Zacharias recently provided telling evidence of the weakness
of the utilitarian approach. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 351 (1989). He conducted two surveys of all lawyers and a pool of laymen in
Tompkins County, New York, where Cornell Law School is located. Id. at 396. His study
showed some support for the proposition that confidentiality encourages both use of
attorneys and more complete disclosure by clients, but the effects were smaller than one
might assume and did not support extreme claims for the privilege. Id. His study also
showed a great deal of misunderstanding of the confidentiality rules by both lawyers and
clients. ld.
While Professor Zacharias's study is not definitive, it highlights what most scholars
had suspected all along: The empirical basis for the privilege is at least uncertain. Other
studies involving both lawyers and other professionals also suggest this same weakness,
although they do provide some support for a positive impact of the privilege on full dis-
closure. See, e.g., Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Em-
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pirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1982);
Weisberg & Wald, supra note 64, at 185--88 (describing study of psychiatric patients);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for
the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
Unfortunately, the empirical question, for which we have virtually no solid answers,
is probably decisive for any utilitarian argument. Cf Goode, supra note 65, at 313 (most
arguments surrounding attorney-client privilege are based on unverified and probably
unverifiable assumptions about the conduct of clients and lawyers that leave commenta-
tors free to make plausible although diametrically opposed claims about its real-world
consequences). Even careful law and economics analysis reaches critical indeterminacy on
the question of whether protection of confidentiality is desirable or undesirable in some
fact patterns that can only be decided by data that do not exist. Shavell, supra note 150,
at 142 & n.46 (intuitive reasons exist why more bad acts would be prevented by an obli-
gation either to disclose or to maintain confidentiality).
However, even without definitive empirical evidence and based solely on general
perceptions, anecdotal information, and logical analysis, it is hard to imagine that the
privilege has no impact on producing more complete disclosures. Professors Hazard and
Hodes state the apparently sound logical argument: "[I]t is intuitively obvious that law-
yers operating under a binding requirement of confidentiality will have at least some
greater ability to gain the trust of at least some clients, and hence to serve them compe-
tently." 1 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 1.6:101, at 128. It is equally hard to
conceive that the privilege is extraordinarily beneficial to any major social goal. There
are a number of reasons unrelated to the privilege why lawyers and clients do not fully
share information. For example, lawyers do not always want to know all the information
a client may possess because full knowledge might limit the lawyer's hand since, for
example, a lawyer cannot make arguments that otherwise would be reasonable if she
learns that the argument is in fact false. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATroRNEYS AT WORK 103--04 (1985); Zacharias, supra, at 367
& n.69. Clients may withhold information not out of concern for further disclosure but
because they fear embarrassment in the eyes of the lawyer or believe that a fully in-
formed lawyer will not vigorously represent them. KENNEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND
PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL 206 (1978); see also MANN, supra, at 40-51 (white-
collar crime clients may not provide full information because of lack of trust, embarrass-
ment, concern with financial interest, and their own determination of proper legal strate-
gy). Finally, on the positive side, many believe that one of the most important, if not the
most important, reasons that clients reveal information fully is a feeling of trust in the
attorney rather than any legal guarantee of confidentiality. Sobelson, supra note 82, at
705 n.6, 712.
167. Basing an argument on a rights-based rationale can be a very useful rhetorical
device, at least as the argument is sometimes made. To claim that a position is necessary
to ensure enjoyment of a right is often the equivalent of asserting that the position is
beyond challenge. Cf. Robert Weisberg, Forward: Criminal Procedure Doctrine: Some
Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832, 835-37 (1985) (on crimi-
nal procedure issues, liberals use rights-based claim not only to dismiss cost-benefit analy-
sis but to assert or assume the categorical nature of the right).
Whereas a utilitarian theory depends upon the possibility of comparative valuation
of outcomes-the maximization of good for society-a rights-based argument denies that
in determining what is right one searches for the best balance of good over evil. Instead
one seeks conformity with a right, which itself is established by some system of valuation
separately from its consequences. WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHIcs 16-17, 34-35 (2d ed.
1973). Thus, rights are independent values in a non-utilitarian system, and arguments in
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These justifications are often treated as mutually exclusive al-
though they may jointly provide support for privileges.1"
A. The Utilitarian Justification
The utilitarian argument posits that a privilege is important to
the fostering of a confidential relationship that will promote full
disclosure of information, which in turn will help achieve impor-
tant social objectives." For the attorney-client privilege, two so-
cial objectives are identified: (1) achieving a just outcome in the
legal matter being handled by the attorney, and (2) allowing the
attorney to learn of contemplated improper actions by the client
and, having that knowledge, to encourage the client to comply
with the law.1
70
terms of rights do properly dismiss the significance of evaluation of the good to society
produced by the practice at issue.
However, the claim that a position is supported by a right does not properly elimi-
nate careful analysis about the validity of that position. The origins and dimensions of
the right should be fully developed. More significantly, problems of relative valuation are
not eliminated. One must be prepared to determine when the right asserted is overridden
by some other equal or more basic right. Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Con-
fidentiality: A "Philosophically Informed" and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medi-
cal Ethics, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 177, 194-95 (1985).
168. See 24 WRGIrr & GRAHAM, supra note 64, at 77 (contending that throughout
entire modern history of privilege courts and commentators have used both justifications
for the privilege, although each tended to emphasize only one of the rationales); Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 131, at 1504-09 (arguing that the two justifications can
be combined).
169. To this point in the argument, all privileges follow the same general form under
the utilitarian argument. However, from this point forward, they differ in the good that
each privilege theoretically promotes.
170. This second justification is succinctly set out in the commentary to the Model
Rules:
[T]o the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes,
the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer
to counsel against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if
full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 23.
The objectives pursued under a utilitarian rationale are not necessarily limited to
the two set out above, although these are clearly the two goals traditionally identified for
the attorney-client privilege. Maximization of good in society could also be enhanced by
the pursuit of other goals, including the protection of individual autonomy, which is often
identified as the right supporting a rights-based rationale for the privilege. If the objec-
tives of the utilitarian rationale are so expanded, one can narrow the distinction between
that rationale and a rights-based rationale. However, the distinction is not totally eliminat-
ed because the rights-based argument claims an independent imperative for its goal rather
than cumulating and comparing the total good across society. See supra note 167.
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The argument that protecting lawyer-client confidences pro-
motes just outcomes, as opposed simply to personally favorable
ones, requires two debatable premises. First, it requires faith in
our adversary system, which depends on the idea that truth will be
best found by two parties each effectively pursuing their individual
claims.' and that fully informed legal experts (lawyers) are im-
portant to the system's efficient and fair operation." Second, and
more important, the argument requires a belief that the facts giv-
ing rise to legal disputes and the implication of those facts are
sometimes ambiguous, and that people with potentially valid claims
may be hesitant to consult lawyers or confide in them fully, par-
ticularly about facts that are personally embarrassing and/or
viewed as potentially legally damaging."3 Indeed, the battle line
171. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court reiterated
this item of faith as applied to the criminal system: "'The very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best
promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.'"
Id. at 655 (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
The most notable advocate of this position is Monroe Freedman. See FREEDMAN,
supra note 141, at 1-8. The view, however, has its critics, particularly in its extreme form
that opponents deride as taking on almost religious overtones. See generally Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
172. Professor Graham presents this aspect of the argument effectively, noting the
complexity of the law as applied to modem society, the mysteriousness of law to laymen,
and the unequal distribution of skill in presenting a legal case, which would place the
shy and unsophisticated party at a disadvantage without help from a professionally
trained legal expert. 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 64, § 5472, at 81.
The United States Supreme Court frequently reiterates elements of this argument.
In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court noted the com-
plexity of regulatory legislation as applied to even a relatively sophisticated corporate
client and recognized the need for legal advice "since compliance with the law in this
area is hardly an instinctive matter." Id. at 392. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976), the Court observed that in the absence of privilege, "the client would be reluc-
tant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal
advice." Id. at 403.
173. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47, § 87, at 314; 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 16, § 2291, at 552; Zacharias, supra note 166, at 366.
An example in criminal litigation is provided by the client who claims self-defense
with respect to a fatal stabbing. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1479-80
(1966). When counsel asks the client whether he usually carries the knife that inflicted
the fatal wound or whether he only had it on the night of the encounter with the dece-
dent, how should the client answer the question? The client may wonder whether it is
worse to be the type of person who usually carries a knife or to have had it only that
night. In the eyes of the law, having the knife solely on the fateful occasion supports an
inference of premeditation. Id. The "correct" answer should, however, be unclear to
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for the debate of the social value of the privilege is often drawn
by the detractors at the relative infrequency of clients with valid
claims who are reticent to provide critical information, as opposed
to the number of invalid claims made more possible by the cloak
of secrecy.174
The argument that facts may be ambiguous and embarrassing
has obvious application in the child abuse area. During litigation
over the breakup of a marriage, lawyers frequently encounter
accusations of child abuse. Even the implication of child abuse
interjected into a divorce case could be a critical factor in the
outcome of both financial and custody issues, and the impact
would be particularly powerful if the damaging information came
by way of a required disclosure from the party's own lawyer. Thus,
it is easy to see how a lawyer's duty to reveal even a "reason to
suspect" child abuse might inhibit the client's candor in describing
unconventional treatment of his children.175
In addition to supporting just outcomes, the utilitarian ratio-
nale also promises a second and even more appealing social objec-
tive. A client's total candor provides the opportunity for the law-
yer to counsel compliance with the law."6 Indeed, this notion is
well established and broadly recognized, with even Justice
Rehnquist accepting it as a basic foundation of the privilege.'"
On the other hand, although this social objective is the basis of
some of the most vigorous defenses of a virtually absolute privi-
lege,17 it also has many skeptics."9
many clients, and it is not at all certain that a client who truly believes that he acted in
self-defense but fears that his story will not be accepted will give the attorney the unvar-
nished truth.
174. Zacharias, supra note 166, at 366-67.
175. As discussed above, however, disclosure in this situation may be required, even
without a fundamental reexamination of the justification of the attorney-client privilege
under the crime-fraud exception to the privilege in its expansive application. See supra
Section III(C). When the lawyer knows of past abuse and keeps that information secret
while successfully maintaining visitation rights, that action makes the commission of the
crime of abuse more likely and the "crime-fraud" exception may apply.
176. See Zacharias, supra note 166, at 369.
177. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-94 (1981).
178. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 17, Rule 1.6 cmt. at 23; Rhode, supra note 171, at
613 n.89; see also Landsman, supra note 166, at 208 (recognizing this objective as poten-
tially "a powerful argument").
179. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 171, at 615 (commenting that "little is known about
the extent to which lawyers have managed to channel patrons along 'proper paths' ");
Simon, supra note 171, at 1142 n.129 (deeming argument "not very impressive"); Zachari-
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This debate about the effectiveness of confidentiality in help-
ing to prevent future wrongdoing is largely beside the point, how-
ever, when it comes to reporting requirements for child abuse.
Most state legislatures have rejected arguments by other profes-
sionals to preserve privileges when the confidential communica-
tions concern potential child abuse, mandating that child abuse
should be revealed even at the expense of treatment of the abuser,
which arguably provides the best hope of avoiding future crime.
For example, psychiatrists have consistently been required to re-
veal legally damaging information provided to them by the per-
petrators, even when it was revealed during voluntary therapy."
The statutes represent either a strongly punitive view-violators
must be punished--or at least a determination that the state's
child protective service officials and prosecutors, rather than indi-
as, supra note 166, at 369, 389 (noting both scholars' skepticism regarding the frequency
with which misconduct is prevented and recounting equivocal empirical support by law-
yers responding to his survey).
180. In State v. Fagalde, 539 P.2d 86 (Wash. 1975), the court concluded that there
was no psychiatrist-patient privilege where a parent revealed abuse in the course of seek-
ing treatment. The court observed that according
[s]uch protection might well be deemed to be in the public interest. But it is
evident that, in its recent enactments, the legislature has attached greater impor-
tance to the reporting of incidents of child abuse and the prosecution of perpe-
trators than to counseling and treatment of persons whose mental or emotional
problems cause them to inflict such abuse.
Id. at 90; see also People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (in
case upholding prosecution of psychologist for failing to report statements made during
therapy with victim and her family, court recognized the family members' collective desire
to seek treatment for offender rather than initiating criminal proceedings not honored by
legislation); In re M.C., 391 N.W.2d 674, 676 (S.D. 1986) (mother's psychotherapist per-
mitted to testify over argument that the privilege should be abrogated only as to state-
ments made by victim). Cf. State v. Ethridge, 352 S.E.2d 673, 677-78 (N.C. 1987) (deem-
ing statement to doctor regarding father's sexual contact with children admissible even
though made as part of treatment for sexually transmitted disease after charges had been
filed and rejecting argument that disclosure would deter naming of sexual contacts be-
cause legislature opted for broadest possible exception to privilege and sought to facilitate
prosecution of child abusers).
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vidual professionals,181 must determine whether treatment or pun-
ishment is appropriate."
A few states, however, have maintained privileges for certain
other professionals, such as clergy and therapists." In those
181. Douglas Besharov, the leading advocate and scholar in the field of child abuse
legislation, has long supported an approach that would mediate between effective report-
ing and maintaining treatment relationships. His approach would require reports from
therapists when abuse is disclosed during ongoing therapy but would authorize child pro-
tective agencies to decline further investigation upon determination that current treatment
was satisfactory. The approach attempts to maximize the potential benefits from continu-
ing an existing relationship while ensuring overall control by responsible public officials.
BESHAROV, supra note 26, at 49; Besharov, supra note 22, at 478-80. This approach was
incorporated into the 1977 draft of the Model Child Protection Act developed by the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, of which Besharov was then the director.
See MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT, supra note 32, at 7, 49.
To dat5, however, only Nevada, which also excludes attorney-client confidences
from reporting requirements, see supra note 44, has adopted such legislation. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 432B.320 (Michie 1991). Given the public demand for vigorous enforce-
ment in this area, the failure of Besharov's proposal to attract support may be the result
of its lack of toughness.
182. Indeed, the very motivation for requiring reporting to child protective service
agencies is the belief that such agencies have the capabilities and the judgment to deter-
mine who can best treat children. Besharov, supra note 22, at 464 (purpose of reporting
is for individuals observing possible abuse, including professionals, to begin the child
protective process so that the police or a child protective agency can become involved,
provide emergency protective services if necessary, and develop a treatment plan).
In the same vein, most states list as the first purpose of their reporting statutes the
protection of children, and they require identification of abused children as a way of
achieving that protection. YOUNES, supra note 15, at 3 ("identification equals protec-
tion"); see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-1 (1990) ("The public policy of this state is: to
protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected through injury and
neglect; to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for children by enhancing
the parental capacity for good child care; to provide a temporary or permanent nurturing
and safe environment for children when necessary; and for these purposes to require the
mandatory reporting of known or suspected child abuse and neglect . . ... "); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-402(a) (Michie 1991) ("The purpose of this part is to protect chil-
dren whose physical or mental health and welfare are adversely affected by brutality,
abuse or neglect by requiring reporting of suspected cases by any person having cause to
believe that such case exists. It is intended that, as a result of such reports, the protec-
tive services of the state shall be brought to bear on the situation to prevent further
abuses, to safeguard and enhance the welfare of children, and to preserve family life.
This part shall be administered and interpreted to provide the greatest possible protection
as promptly as possible for children.").
183. Among the twenty-two states that have reporting statutes applicable to attorneys,
see supra note 40 and accompanying text, four protect the clergyman-penitent privilege.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(2) (Baldwin 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-503(2) (1989); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210(a)(ii) (1986).
One of these, Oregon, protects psychologists and psychiatrists as well. OR. REV. STAT. §
418.750.
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states, preserving the attorney-client privilege to encourage compli-
ance with the law may be consistent with the policy judgments of
the legislature. However, in states that have abrogated other privi-
leges, and even in states that continue to recognize some privileges
but require psychotherapists to report abuse, it is difficult to justify
preservation of the attorney-client privilege to encourage compli-
ance with the law.' 8
While it is not clear that any group of professionals knows
how to treat child abusers successfully,"r psychotherapists at least
have a treatment regimen that holds some hope for changing be-
havior." Lawyers by contrast cannot claim any special ability to
induce legal behavior through therapeutic conversation; indeed,
preservation of the privilege is inconsistent with intuitively the
most promising move by an attorney-the threatened exposure of
confessed abuse if the client does not take steps to reduce the
Recognition of the clergyman-penitent privilege may, however, rest more on defer-
ence to religious freedom than on a determination that effective treatment should not be
deterred by piercing the privilege. See Mitchell, supra note 22, at 776-77, 818 (arguing
that constitutional right to free exercise of religion provides a unique and powerful jus-
tification for the clergyman-penitent privilege).
184. The argument in favor of preserving the psychotherapist-patient privilege would
appear to be far stronger than that for attorneys. For example, a psychiatrist may deter-
mine based on expert knowledge that a child would benefit more from rehabilitation of
the abuser than from his incarceration. Coleman, supra note 79, at 1121; see also Patton,
supra note 91, at 495-96 (arguing that rehabilitation and family reunification are often
preferable for the interests of child and society than prosecution of offender). Although
certainly not infallible, this judgment and the treatment provided should logically be far
more helpful than any action most lawyers can take to promote compliance with the law,
other than perhaps an act antithetical to the privilege-helping to prosecute the perpetra-
tor. Moreover, the need for psychotherapist-patient confidentiality would appear just as
great or greater under any utilitarian theory, as candor regarding embarrassing informa-
tion is critical to effective treatment. See generally Coleman, supra note 79, at 1122-35.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of reporting statutes do not exempt psychiatrists. See
supra note 183.
185. See Furby et al., supra note 156, at 25 (stating that the lack of a clear pattern in
the results of the authors' study of sex offender recidivism makes even tentative conclu-
sions concerning the effectiveness of treatment inadvisable).
186. See Robert Prentky & Ann W. Burgess, Rehabilitation of Child Molesters: A
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 109, 111, 114-15 (1990) (noting some
favorable, although admittedly inconclusive, study results for treatment and arguing that
there is little support for the proposition that sexual abusers do not respond to rehabili-
tative treatment).
The weakness of the evidence supporting effective treatment of abusers could well
help to influence a legislature not to grant privileged status to conversations between a
child molester and his therapist. However, the unproven effectiveness of treatment does
not provide a basis for favoring the attorney-client privilege.
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likelihood of reoccurrence. The folly of preferential treatment for
attorneys may readily be seen by imagining a scenario in which a
lawyer has secured the confidential admission of her client regard-
ing past abuse. She wishes to advise the client to seek treatment
in hopes of preventing future abuse, but understands that any oth-
er professional to whom the client is referred will be required to
report the prior conduct if disclosed during therapy. In that situa-
tion, preserving the privilege for the lawyer alone has limited
utility and little theoretical cogency."
B. The Rights-Based Justification
A second major justification for affording privileged status to
attorney-client communications is a rights-based argument that
holds as its central goal the preservation of the client's autono-
my.1 This argument is that, in an increasingly regulated world,
individuals have the right to be protected from encroachments by
the state and by third parties. Lawyers are important in maintain-
ing that autonomy by both enforcing affirmative rights and helping
to avoid imposition of control by others. Complete information is
required, the argument goes, for lawyers to achieve these goals.
Moreover, when clients are required to share information with
lawyers to protect or enforce autonomy interests, maintaining
confidences also helps honor that autonomy by maintaining client
control over private information.'89
Although not limited to criminal cases, the rights-based justifi-
cation fits most comfortably with the function of the criminal de-
187. It is not completely illogical, however, to preserve the attorney-client privilege
under the theory that the lawyer may help prevent crime, as she can warn the client of
the consequences of law violation, advise the client to leave the environment where rep-
etition would be likely, and generally counsel against future violations. See Mass. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 90-2 (June 15, 1990) (discussing possibility
that potential abuser would leave employment at camp for children). The arsenal of
treatments available to the attorney is not impressive, however, and legislatures have
apparently determined that giving other professionals the right to provide treatment they
judge beneficial is not worth any additional risk to children.
188. Subin, supra note 74, at 1160-66; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation
of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U.
COLO. L. REV. 349, 355 (1981) (arguing that preservation of client's confidences is close
to a categorical imperative, which is based on the obligation to serve rather than to
participate in judging the client).
This argument is, broadly speaking, decntological, as contrasted with utilitarian
justifications. See Pizzimenti, sup~a note 82, at 444-48.
189. Subin, supra note 74, at 1160; see Pizzimenti, supra note 82, at 446.
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fense attorney, whose role is to protect the accused from the im-
position of the state's punitive power. Even in this narrow form,
the attorney-client privilege has had its detractors, most notably
Jeremy Bentham, who argued that a guilty person should not have
the help of the privilege in escaping punishment." ° However, the
principle that even the guilty are entitled to effective representa-
tion is deeply ingrained in our legal culture."' Indeed, the rights-
based theory remains the bedrock, and perhaps the only viable
justification for protecting the attorney-client privilege in the area
of child abuse."
190. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302-12 (London, Hunt
& Clarke 1827). The flavor of Bentham's attack on the privilege is captured in his pro-
posed statement by the attorney to a criminal defendant:
[T]he first thing the advocate or attorney will say to his client, will
be,--Remember that, whatever you say to me, I shall be obliged to tell, if
asked about it. What, then, will be the consequence? That a guilty person will
not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance from his law adviser,
in the way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at present.
Id. at 304.
Even commentators who argue against broad claims for lawyer confidentiality find a
greater justification for confidentiality in criminal cases. See Subin, supra note 74, at 1167
n.358 (taking issue with Bentham's argument in the context of criminal litigation because
of its relationship to the privilege against self-incrimination that should mean client's
admission to lawyer should not be used to convict).
191. Professor Wolfram stated the point succinctly: "What divides communications
about past crimes from those about future ones is that lawfully assisting a past wrongdo-
er to obtain an acquittal is an accepted contradiction built into the adversary system. The
risk of undeserved acquittals is accepted as the price for vigorous advocacy in an ad-
versarial system." WOLFRAM, supra note 71, § 6.4.10, at 279 (citation omitted).
192. As noted earlier, simply claiming that a right supports the privilege should prove
effective or ineffective as a justification depending upon the legitimacy of the right
claimed and its strength in comparison to other recognized rights. Although precise valua-
tion of rights may be an impossibility, the right claimed should at least have a plausible
claim of being the equal of whatever rights must be denied as the cost of its enjoyment.
See supra note 167.
If one compares the importance of the rights involved, it is difficult to make a
plausible argument that ensuring the personal autonomy of the client in all legal matters
outweighs what must obviously be recognized as an important, indeed a quite similar,
right of the child not be physically or sexually abused. Where, however, the substantial
coercive powers of the state in criminal litigation are involved, the autonomy claim is
potentially powerful. One can at least make a plausible claim that resisting encroachment
by the state can constitute an equivalent right to that of the child. See Moore, supra
note 167, at 213-14 (in criminal and not civil litigation, respect for human dignity of the
defendant is arguably a paramount goal). Thus, as the client faces the real prospect of
prosecution, a rights-based rationale offers substantial support for the attorney-client privi-
lege.
In this context, the rights-based analysis begins to look somewhat similar to a utili-
tarian analysis with effective assistance of counsel as the objective pursued. However,
1992]
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In summary, when one examines the area of child abuse and
the legislative pattern of the reporting laws, one finds that the
utilitarian rationale for the privilege is badly undercut if not en-
tirely destroyed. The most attractive supporting argument-that the
attorney-client privilege should be preserved to permit attorneys to
encourage compliance with the law-is inconsistent with the denial
of privilege to other professionals for whom the rationale would
often have greater validity. The justification that protecting confi-
dences is generally important to reaching accurate results in litiga-
tion is weak when examined separately in this area, because the
goal of protecting powerless children conflicts with the most likely
reason for clients' avoidance of full disclosure: the fear of reveal-
ing ambiguous but potentially damaging conduct. That ambiguous
conduct might have involved abuse of a child, who may remain
unknown and continue to be victimized unless the lawyer discloses
the confidential communication. The balancing of expressed social
interests therefore likely favors disclosure in such cases." By
contrast, there appears no express legislative purpose to inhibit the
effective legal representation of those who may be charged with
abuse, an area where the rights-based justification is most power-
ful.
whereas the utilitarian rationale supports the privilege where it aids determination of the
truth, a rights-based rationale goes further and provides support regardless of the utility
of candor in achieving a just outcome. Resisting the power of the state is a goal worthy
of support under a rights-based argument, which, besides providing utility by achieving a
just outcome, furnishes a modicum of protection to the autonomy of the client against a
most powerful encroachment by the state.
193. This argument, while apparently reasonable, is probably unfair. It has long been
recognized that any effort to test the privilege by separating out individual situations and
requiring justification for each, particularly the most problematic ones, would result in
rejection of the privilege. As Professor Wigmore argued, if the attorney-client privilege
should be maintained, "[i]t is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, §
2291, at 554; cf. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2(b), at 26-31 (2d ed. 1987) (critiquing argument regarding the
lack of empirical evidence for the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule); id. § 1.2(e), at 43-45 (rejecting contention that suppression should not
be imposed in the most serious cases).
If the privilege is examined in individual circumstances, a similar negative judgment
about the value of the privilege versus its costs would likely also be made in cases in-
volving particularly dangerous criminals, such as homicidal individuals and major drug
kingpins.
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C. Constitutional Bases for the Attorney-Client Privilege
Whether legislatures can in fact limit application of the attor-
ney-client privilege for potential or actual criminal defendants de-
pends upon whether the privilege has a firm constitutional basis or
is merely a creature of common law and legislative grace. The an-
swer to that question is not in much doubt. Although often associ-
ated with constitutional rights and certainly protected at its core
by at least the Sixth Amendment, most of the breadth and sweep
of the attorney-client privilege is without constitutional protec-
tion."
1. The Fifth Amendment's Non-Protection of the Attorney-
Client Privilege. In Fisher v. United States,195 the Supreme Court
ruled that the Fifth Amendment affords no direct protection for
the attorney-client privilege when confidential client information is
compelled from the attorney. As long as the state does not require
the client to make statements to his lawyer in the first instance,
the necessary element of compulsion is missing. Statements volun-
tarily made by the client, although covered by the attorney-client
privilege, are not protected by the client's Fifth Amendment
rights. " A number of federal and state courts have reiterated
this point in various contexts,1" including the observation that the
scope of the privilege may be changed by state legislative action
without violating Fisher.19
194. WoLFRAM, supra note 71, §§ 6.2.1-6.2.4, at 248-50; see also Clutchette v.
Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986); Strong v.
State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en bane). But see Michael B.
Dashjian, People v. Meredith: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's
Constitutional Rights, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1048, 1050-58 (1982) (arguing for a constitutional
basis for the privilege under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
195. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
For the Fifth Amendment right to apply, three basic prerequisites must be met: the
individual must face compulsion from the government; the statement must be communica-
tive; and it must be incriminating. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoe- -
na Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1987) (discussing
basic framework).
196. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10.
197. See Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir.) (violation of attorney-client
privilege cannot be asserted as basis of constitutional recovery), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830
(1981); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1978) (Fisher does not
incorporate attorney-client privilege into the Fifth Amendment); OKC Corp. v. Williams,
461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (attorney-client privilege is rule of evidence, not
principle of constitutional law).
198. See State v. Jancsek, 730 P.2d 14, 16-21, 24 (Or. 1986) (en banc) (Fisher not
199
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The lack of Fifth Amendment protection for the attorney-
client privilege does not mean that the government would be total-
ly free to compel disclosures from the attorney. For instance, if a
lawyer obtains information from a client under the explicit or
implicit promise that the information is protected by a then-exist-
ing privilege and the lawyer later discloses the information under
governmental coercion, that revelation may violate at least the *due
process rights of the client.1" However, if the privilege were
changed by legislative action prior to the client's consultation to
eliminate the guarantee of confidentiality upon which the defen-
dant may have relied, it is difficult to find much in the theory of
the Fifth Amendment, or due process for that matter, that would
render the legislative action unconstitutional."
2. The Sixth Amendment's Narrow Support for the Attorney-
Client Privilege. The Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel is a much more fruitful, but clearly limited,
source of support for the attorney-client privilege. Although the
Supreme Court has not established its precise contours in this
context,"1 the right to counsel as it has come to be accepted in
the latter half of the twentieth century surely includes some guar-
antee of confidential consultations with an attorney.' However,
controlling as to definition of attorney-client privilege, which was codified in the state
with a specific history of the treatment of representatives of the client, and accordingly
protections afforded vicariously to client's Fifth Amendment rights through the privilege
are different than they would be under Fisher). See generally Reitz, supra note 164, at
637 (noting that Fisher's extension of attorney-client privilege to cover production of
client's documents held by lawyer not binding on state courts, although its analysis has
generally been followed).
199. United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1027 (1990).
200. Presumably, if the privilege were so radically altered, lawyers would warn their
clients of the dangers of full disclosure of incriminating information about child abuse
without regard to how they currently feel about the need to disclose the limits of the
privilege. See supra note 82. The number of damaging revelations by clients and concom-
itantly the basis for reporting would presumably diminish as a result of the warning.
201. There is, to be sure, some clear suggestion that confidential communications have
a Sixth Amendment foundation. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiali-
ty of communications between the accused and his attorney."). Furthermore, the Court
has stated that deliberate invasions of the attorney-defendant relationship that result in
prejudice violate the constitutional right to counsel. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
552 (1977).
202. See Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (6th Cir. 1983) (state court convic-
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the Sixth Amendment right is quite limited in coverage. It has no
place in civil litigation, and attaches in criminal litigation only
when a suspect formally becomes the accused by indictment, pre-
liminary hearing, or other similar step in the criminal proceed-
ing.
Accordingly, a legislature could constitutionally eliminate the
protections of the attorney-client privilege except when criminal
litigation has been formally initiated.' This statement may seem
tion reversed by federal court based on state's use at trial of written document constitut-
ing confidential communication between lawyer and client); United States v. Melvin, 650
F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (communication covered by attorney-client privilege also
protected by Sixth Amendment). See generally United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253,
263-66 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (outlining Sixth Amendment right against government intrusion
into attorney-client relationship).
203. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986) (holding that Sixth Amendment
attaches only after formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings and the fact that
pretrial event may have important consequences at trial is insufficient to trigger right to
counsel); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977) (arraignment on warrant consti-
tuted initiation of formal charges that brought Sixth Amendment right into operation);
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right attaches only at or
after adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated by "formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment").
This doctrine was applied in a recent opinion by the Maryland Attorney General.
Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 90-007 (Feb. 8, 1990). The question posed was whether mental
health providers were required to report child abuse disclosed to them by a patient when
the patient was referred to the provider by an attorney and thus the conversation was
covered by the attorney-client privilege as construed under state law. The Attorney Gen-
eral concluded that in most instances a mental health provider was required by an un-
ambiguous statutory obligation to report abuse even if the consultation was arranged by
an attorney for legal advice. The attorney-client privilege would not provide protection
against required disclosure except when it rested on a constitutional basis, and only after
the suspect formally became the accused did the Sixth Amendment give constitutional
support to the privilege. Id.
In some situations, the Sixth Amendment may protect confidential communications
at an earlier point. Compelling confidential information from an attorney often has the
effect of denying the accused the assistance of that particular lawyer by disqualifying
counsel from representing the client further in the case. Where the accused had a sub-
stantial preexisting relationship with that attorney or where the attorney has special ex-
pertise, the required disclosure of information which results in disqualification at least
raises a constitutional concern. See Michael F. Orman, Note, A Critical Appraisal of the
Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense Attorneys,
1986 DuKE L.J. 145, 164. However, the argument for this position is not particularly
strong, id., and it is generally inapplicable to the factual patterns in which disclosures of
child abuse would be compelled.
204. Important issues regarding the scope of the privilege would remain, of course.
For instance, it is unclear how broadly or narrowly to construe a constitutionalized attor-
ney-client privilege when the conversation is relevant to the charged crime but also in-
volves a "separate" criminal incident. For example, in People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798
1992]
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shocking, suggesting an unrealistic, apocalyptic result, but to the
contrary is based on uncontroversial constitutional interpretation.
The attorney-client privilege as it applies to reporting of child
abuse and indeed to testimony by an attorney against the (former)
client depends largely upon the good judgment of legislatures and
their determination of sound social policy.'
(Co. Ct.), affd mem., 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. 'Div. 1975), affd per curiam, 359 N.E.2d
377 (N.Y. 1976), discussed in note 67 supra, would the client's revelation regarding a
separate murder be protected by the Constitution or could the state explicitly eliminate
the attorney-client privilege in this context? The same type of issue would arise with
regard to incidents of child abuse that might be relatively separate events, joinable at
trial, or even admissible as "other crimes" evidence, see FED. R. EvID. 404(b), to prove
guilt on the formally charged offense.
Whether the definition of a separate crime for purposes of limiting police interroga-
tion of a suspect without counsel should be the same as that for purposes of defining the
scope of constitutionally protected confidentiality between an accused and counsel is also
not clear. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 431-32 (individual represented on burglary charge not
covered by Sixth Amendment right to counsel with regard to questioning on unrelated
murder charge); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985) (individual formally
charged on one offense could be questioned about new offense but statements concerning
charged offense inadmissible under Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
If the scope of the Sixth Amendment is the same for both interrogation and the
protection of confidences between the defendant and counsel, then that protection ap-
pears to be quite narrow indeed. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2207 (1991)
("The Sixth Amendment right ... is offense-specific."); United States v. Nocella, 849
F.2d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 1988) (federal charges involving distribution of cocaine distinct from
formally charged state offense of marijuana possession in spite of existence of combined
investigation by federal and state authorities into defendant's drug dealings); State v. Bry-
an, 551 A.2d 807, 809, 818 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (theft by false pretenses considered
separate offense from murder under Moulton even though theft was apparent motive for
murder and was jointly charged in indictment with it), rev'd on other grounds, 571 A.2d
170, 176-77 (Del. 1990) (relying on state constitutional rights rather than federal Sixth
Amendment); State v. Lale, 415 N.W.2d 847, 848, 851 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (charges for
possession of other weapons discovered pursuant to warrant issued to search for handgun
used in murder considered unrelated under Moulton), review denied, 422 N.W.2d 860
(Wis. 1988).
205. Even though not protected by the Constitution in most contexts, no legislature is
likely to undertake a wholesale elimination of the attorney-client privilege because the
privilege enjoys such traditional acceptance in our culture and its preservation serves the
interests of so many diverse social institutions. Rather, limitations upon the privilege are
likely to take the form of modifications in discrete areas to meet specific concerns, such
as child abuse reporting. The question for the future of the privilege becomes whether
these discrete changes are isolated or numerous, whether they generate a momentum for
additional limitations, and whether the new exceptions are interpreted broadly or narrow-
ly by the courts.
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING LAWS
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued above for two positions regarding the impact of
current child abuse reporting legislation on the attorney-client
privilege. First, with the possible exception of one state,2 the
legislation does not indicate any intention to abrogate the attor-
ney-client privilege as it has been historically interpreted. Second,
absent an affirmative restriction of the privilege by statute, the
attorney-client privilege should be interpreted to prevent com-
pelled reporting of child abuse based on information that would be
covered if the lawyer were called to testify.
Given the above two propositions, the conclusion follows that,
under ethics rules regarding confidentiality, a lawyer is not entitled
to reveal information under the theory that she is required to do
so by other provision of law-there is no such legal requirement
for disclosure of information covered by the attorney-client privi-
lege. However, information covered only by the broader ethical
rule protecting confidential information is subject to the require-
ments of mandatory reporting laws, which do constitute a super-
seding legal duty to report; and the ethical rules, as contrasted
with the attorney-client privilege, provide no basis to protect the
lawyer against criminal prosecution if she fails to report. Thus, in
states with mandatory reporting laws applicable to lawyers, a law-
yer must report information about abuse when, for example, she
learns about it through a third party or in a conversation that is
not made confidentially.
Reporting of child abuse may be authorized under the excep-
tion to the confidentiality requirement where the lawyer has sub-
stantial evidence that the client will commit future abuse. Categori-
cal statements cannot be made regarding the effect of all revela-
tions of past child abuse because the determination in each case
will be heavily fact-bound. The inquiry will remain a difficult one,
and ethics rulings that stay true to sound principles cannot make
the determination simple.
Unfortunately, the above propositions do not appear obvious
from the face of the various state reporting statutes, which were
drafted without any explicit focus on the obligation of attorneys to
disclose confidential information. Moreover, there is an urgent
206. That state is Mississippi. For a discussion of the Mississippi statutes, see supra
notes 45, 47 and accompanying text.
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need for clarification of the law in this area to cut through a pro-
cedural thicket created by the combination of mandatory reporting
duties enforced by criminal sanctions that require prompt compli-
ance and ethics rulings that can determine only questions of confi-
dentiality but cannot definitively interpret other relevant legal doc-
trines. Although courts and, to a lesser degree, ethics panels can
provide some assistance, legislative action is probably required to
avoid disclosure by lawyers, who understandably will act out of a
need for personal and professional self-protection.
In addition to eliminating uncertainties in the law, the legisla-
tures may wish to examine the basic nature of the protection af-
forded to confidential information under the attorney-client priv-
ilege and reform this aspect of the law as it relates to child abuse
reporting. Three basic reforms may be considered:
Option I: Full Protection of Traditionally Privileged Communi-
cations. If a legislature wants to provide robust protection to the
attorney-client privilege, -it should declare an intention to extend
the protection of the attorney-client privilege to otherwise required
disclosures under mandatory reporting requirements. This declara-
tion necessarily implies a reaffirmation of the historically optimistic
judgment that the assistance of counsel is on a broad scale an in-
strument of social benefit.
Option II- Robust Protection of the Rights of the Potential
Criminal Defendant. A state wishing to give substantial but limit-
ed protection to the attorney-client privilege that will facilitate
effective consultation in most situations may want to abrogate the
attorney-client privilege in child abuse cases but exempt from
reporting requirements statements made to an attorney in confi-
dence for the purpose of obtaining legitimate legal advice by
someone who is or who may become the criminally accused.'
This option best balances the competing interests involved in the
privilege as traditionally recognized with a vigorous social policy of
combating child abuse.
Option IM Minimal, Constitutionally Sufficient Protection. A
state that wishes to pass constitutionally .acceptable legislation
207. This option is modeled on the protection of the privilege afforded in Nevada. See
NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220(2)(i) (Michie 1991).
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designed to produce the maximum child abuse reporting by attor-
neys and accordingly the minimum protection to relevant confiden-
tial information should abrogate the attorney-client privilege except
for confidential communications between a defendant formally
charged with child abuse and his attorney with regard to his legal
representation in that case.
Before a legislature takes action on any of these three basic
models, it needs to reach a conclusion about two sets of issues.
The first is a fundamental determination, discussed above, about
both the relative worth of lawyers as agents for positive action and
the extent of protections to be afforded to those who may become
criminal defendants charged with child abuse. The second is an
equally basic, perhaps fundamentally more important, judgment
about the role and the extent of criminal law regulation in our
society.
The most novel aspect of the legal doctrines discussed in this
Article is the use of criminal sanctions to enforce reporting of
confidential client information that is reflected in the basic design
of child abuse reporting statutes. The requirement under penalty
of law that crime must be reported is not new to our history,'
208. Some people will immediately move to have the legislature impose an un-
equivocal duty on lawyers to report suspected abuse, explicitly abrogating the attorney-
client privilege, and will do so with the absolute best of motives to protect our children.
Letter from John S. Niblock, President, North Carolina Child Advocacy Institute, to
Robert J. Robinson, Chairman, Ethics Committee, North Carolina State Bar Ass'n 1
(Sept. 10, 1991) (on file with author). Such calls for action are appealing in the impor-
tant cause of doing something about child abuse, but I contend the changes would be
largely ineffective for that purpose and otherwise quite unfortunate.
209. As part of a set of common law duties to report crime and to aid in the appre-
hension of the perpetrators, English law recognized the crime of misprision that "made it
the duty of every citizen to disclose any treason or felony of which he had knowledge."
3 W.S. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 388-89 (1927); see also Sykes v.
Director of Pub. Prosecution, [1962] A.C. 528, 560 (1961). See generally P.R. Glazebrook,
Misprision of Felony-Shadow or Phantoim, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1964); P.R.
Glazebrook, How Long, Then, Is the Arm of the Law to Be?, 25 MOD. L. REv. 301
(1962) [hereinafter Glazebrook, How Long, Then].
Misprision of a felony would therefore appear to be a crime that attorneys too
could commit and that might have provided a fertile testing ground for the operation of
the attorney-client privilege and ethical issues presented by child abuse reporting laws. By
and large, this did not prove true in the United States for a number of reasons. First,
some jurisdictions, such as the federal government, limited the definition of the offense.
They required actual concealment of a crime rather than simply knowledge of its occur-
rence. See e.g., Lancy v. .United States, 356 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 922 (1966); Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934). Or, they
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but using criminal penalties to encourage crime detection is cer-
tainly atypicalEO It is a small part of the increasing overall regu-
lation of our society and particularly a growing tendency to use
the criminal law in attempting to solve every difficult social prob-
lem. These trends should be matters of great public concern. 1
required witnessing of the crime or its preparation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.69.100 (West 1988). In both instances, the traditional attorney-client privilege would not
apply under ordinary analysis. See supra note 47 (observations generally not protected by
privilege); supra note 132 and accompanying text (involvement by lawyer in criminal en-
terprise not protected by privilege). Second, the attorney-client privilege was recognized
explicitly as an exception to the duty to report. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2921.22(E)(1) (Baldwin 1992).
Third, the crime has rarely been prosecuted, principally, it seems, for policy rea-
sons. As Chief Justice Marshall put it in Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556
(1822): "It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every
offence which comes to his knowledge; but the law which would punish him in every
case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man." Id. at 575-76. Largely based
on policy, several states have officially abolished the crime. See, e.g., Holland v. State,
302 So. 2d 806, 808-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (misprision is incompatible with mod-
em concept of personal freedom); Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1068-78 (Md. 1979)
(discussing history and shortcomings of crime, and concluding that it was incompatible
with modem values). See generally Robert E. Meade, Comment, Misprision of Felony: A
Crime Whose Time Has Come, Again, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 199 (1975) (analyzing history
and shortcomings of traditional definition of crime and arguing for revival of narrow ver-
sion of offense); Carl W. Mullis, III, Comment, Misprision of Felony: A Reappraisal, 23
EMORY L. REV. 1095 (1974) (tracing development and criticism of common law crime;
arguing for usefulness of offense if narrowed to limited number of crimes and restricted
group of reporters; and recognizing defense to crime for information covered by tradition-
al privileges, such as attorney-client privilege). Abolition is not universal, however. See,
e.g., State v Carson, 262 S.E.2d 918 (S.C. 1980) (misprision remains crime in South Car-
olina); see also John H. Hare, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Criminal Law, 33
S.C. L. REV. 1, 65-69 (1981).
The most interesting point from this history is that the common law definition of
the crime may indeed have recognized a defense for the attorney-client and other "evi-
dentiary" privileges. In Sykes, Lord Denning noted that "[n]ondisclosure may sometimes
be justified or excused on the ground of privilege," observing specifically that it would be
no misprision for a lawyer, who had been told by his client that he had committed a
felony, not to report it to the police on the basis that he had a duty to keep the infor-
mation confidential. [1962] A.C. 528, 564; see GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART 426 (2d ed. 1961) (interpreting Lord Denning's somewhat peculiar
statement in Sykes that the lawyer would have a "claim of right made in good faith" to
mean that the professional confidential relationship in fact provided justification for non-
disclosure).
Finally, there appear to be no cases in which attorneys have been prosecuted for
misprision where the conduct involved only failure to report knowledge of a crime.
210. Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 83-001 (July 18, 1989) (absent specific statute, no citizen
has a legal obligation to the state to report a suspected crime).
211. Professor Fried has argued that this general tendency "to federalize state crimes
and to criminalize common law torts . . . has placed a new power in the hands of feder-
al prosecutors" resulting in "unprecedented intrusions into attorney-client relationships"
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In 1983, Senator Arlen Specter proposed legislation that
would have moved us to a new level. In the wake of the debate
and the vote of the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association approving the Model Rules that require only limited
disclosure of clients' illegal plans, Senator Specter proposed leg-
islation that would have created a duty, enforced by federal crimi-
nal penalties, for a lawyer to report both future criminality and
past crime when the lawyer's services had aided the scheme 1  It
would have constituted a modern-day revival of the crime of mis-
prision, this time directed uniquely at lawyers, and would have
exhibited most of the historical weaknesses of misprision in being
tremendously broad, vague, and intimidating."' Fortunately, the
proposed legislation died quickly 14
Clearly, the reporting of child abuse does not take us to that
brave new world. It is a step in that direction, however; and so
legislatures should avoid too quickly deciding that lawyers, because
they may be propitiously situated, should be required under crimi-
nal penalties to report what they know and what they suspect
about their clients. The protection of children from abuse would
be rendered only the most minor aid by such a development.
Lawyers are rarely among the first to learn of abuse, s and the
net loss of information occasioned by the privilege is relatively
minimal as it is the privilege's very promise of confidentiality that
encourages the initial candid and damaging revelation."6 Overall,
through the "crime-fraud" exception. Fried, supra note 64, at 499.
212., S. Res. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. 2281
(1983). The bill was entitled "The Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Act of 1983" and com-
bined the broader disclosure requirements of the Kutak Commission with the federal mail
fraud statute. 129 CONG. REC. at 2283. The federal jurisdictional element was provided
by the mailing of some document helpful in the illegal scheme.
213. One of the worst and most criticized features of the crime of misprision of a
felony was its incredible breadth and vagueness. See, e.g., Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054,
1074-78 (Md. 1979) (finding that the crime is unacceptable by modem standards and
holding that it is not a chargeable offense under state law); Glazebrook, How Long,
Then, supra note 209, at 311-12. For a discussion of misprision of felony generally, see
supra note 209.
214. While hearings were conducted, the witnesses appearing were generally critical of
the proposal, Senate Panel Holds Hearing on Proposed Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Act,
33 Crim. L. Rptr. (BNA) at 2103 (May 4, 1983), and no congressional action was taken
on the bill.
215. See Besharov, supra note 22, at 476-77.
216. Opponents of the privilege often miss the point that the conversations that the
privilege keeps confidential would likely never have occurred in the absence of protec-
1992]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the precedent set for lawyers as reporters of crime and as infor-
mants on their clients, although capable of being limited to the
child abuse area, will likely have far-reaching, unfortunate conse-
quences that outweigh the beneficial effects of potentially in-
creased reporting in combating the horror of child abuse.
tion. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66
VA. L. REV. 597, 610-11 ("Because the same information might not exist were it not for
the privilege, any loss of information when the privilege is upheld may be more imagined
than real. Without the privilege, there might be less information, because the communica-
tions between attorney and client would be changed.") (footnotes omitted); Developments
in the Law, supra note 131, at 1508 (arguing that because of this point, "evidentiary costs
are less weighty than utilitarians have traditionally assumed") (footnotes omitted); see also
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (noting that "the attorney-client
privilege puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never
taken place").
Thus, if the privilege is removed for conversations with attorneys, some more infor-
mation will be made available to the prosecution, but particularly if lawyers advise clients
of the prospect of disclosure, the amount of that additional information is likely to be
relatively minimal.
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